A Lightning War: France

Author: William Waller
Published on: Aug 21, 2001

Paul Reynaud, the French Premier, telephoned Churchill early on 15th May, to tell him that the Allies were beaten. This was unusual talk from, it later transpired, one of the very few French leaders determined to stand against Hitler's tyranny and the capture of France. Churchill, who immediately flew over to France to find out the reasons for the call, found the government a mass of defeatism, and the generals full of reasons for not acting.

With many honourable exceptions among politicians, fighting men and soldiers, the French people were not prepared to endure the hardships that they knew would come from resisting the German armies. The blitzkrieg through their north east region and the losses experienced by their armies, had already brought on the dangerous defeatism that was to be so cleverly exploited by Petain, Lavalle and others. By 15th May, after 5 days of conflict, 16 French generals had been dismissed for failing in their duty. Of the already long exposed flanks of Guderian's panzers, where they had broken through between the French 9th and 2nd Armies, Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief present at the 15th May conference, could only acknowledge that they were vulnerable but could offer nothing constructive about counter-attacking. The 3rd Tank Division, under General Flavigny, had been sent to do just that on 14th May but, after looking at the situation, the General decided to call off the attack until the next day. Then he gave up the idea altogether. When asked, after the war, why he had not attacked an enemy who had no support troops, had no artillery except the tanks' guns, and was negotiating three water courses at once on pontoons, he said the counter-attack was "bound to fail" and he wished to "avoid disaster." With such thinking in the army from the Commander-in-Chief down, there was not much that they could blame ordinary soldiers for if they did not do their duty.

Now, on 5th June, after the BEF owed much of its survival to the bravery of French troops, and many of those French troops owed 5 years in Nazi prisoner of war camps to the cowardice of the French troops who hid in the ruins of Dunkirk, the same dichotomy could be seen throughout the army and the civilian population of France. There were those who wanted no part of Hitler's plans for them and were prepared to fight until it was no longer possible. And there were those, like the mayor of Vienne who brought the town's women to the bridge to stop its destruction by French engineers, leaving it intact for the Germans to use; and those like people in various places who tried to stop their soldiers from fighting so that the Germans would not destroy their homes; and those like the people of Royan who welcomed the Germans knowing that they would bring law and order back, after the uncertainty of the days of battle.

It seemed, however that most had decided that it was pointless to fight on, especially with the very best of France's divisions now lost in the first 25 days of fighting. There remained only very mediocre second-line troops, with some untrained new recruits, a total of 49 divisions against 143 divisions including 10 panzer, which now set out on a more conventional type of conquest on a 400 mile front across France. Within 5 days, by 10th June, the government had shown its metal, despite the presence of Reynaud, by declaring Paris an open city and leaving it for the enemy to occupy which they accordingly did on 14th June. On 16th June Reynaud, in trying to get his cabinet to accept a unique offer of political union with Britain, was defeated in a vote by over half of them and resigned. Petain was asked to form a new government and, promptly on 17th , sent emissaries for an armistice which was finally signed on 24th June, 6 weeks after Hitler launched his blitzkrieg through Belgium.

The destruction of the European way of life was a shock felt all around the world as colonial countries came to realize that their masters were not infallible; as America slowly began to wake up to the fact that they could not stay out of this one, the same as they had not been able to stay out of the first one; as Stalin began to realize that he was riding a tiger and that he was probably its next victim; and as Britain and the British people accepted as axiomatic, their role in standing alone against the Germans. The writer remembers being infected with the scare stories of paratroops landing, of anti-personnel mines being dropped disguised as pens or packets of sweets(candy)!, of being wary of any strangers, but he cannot remember any member of the family other than taking it for granted that we had a fight on our hands. It was a scary time, waiting for the axe to fall.

It took Hitler, as reported by all those closest to him, as equally axiomatic that the British would be anxious for peace, and he had even drafted the terms of a peace treaty full of clemency and good will. As time passed, he could not make himself believe that they were really prepared to oppose him and only slowly came round to the realization of the true situation. Even then, on 16th July, in issuing an order for the preparation of a plan of invasion, he added in the words that it was to be used "if necessary to carry it out." On 19th July he made a speech to the Reichstag offering peace and telling the British people "I can see no reason why this war must go on." Within the hour the offer was rejected - by the BBC! Churchill later wrote that this reply was made without any prompting from the government, but it did, after all, simply reflect the feelings of the whole of the country.