Armies, Smugglers, and Borders: Part II. The Crackdown and the Coup
Author: Carey GoodmanPublished on: Aug 12, 2002
In a televised address Mr. Gorbachev stated that because the people in the Baltic republics (in particular Lithuania) believed their governments could not protect their interests, the Soviet Union was authorized to act for them. As part of this attempt to "restore order", Mr. Gorbachev urged the resumption of the pro-Soviet constitution in Lithuania. An hour and a half later Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis responded: "The seizing of one country by another and assertions that its constitutional supremacy is an act which has not been witnessed in centuries". He also stated that by forcing such an ultimatum, Mr. Gorbachev indirectly acknowledged the validity of the constitution adopted in connection with the 11 March 1990 independence resolution.
On the night of 11 January 1991 bombs slightly damaged military installations in all three Baltic republics. The Soviets blamed Baltic nationalists, and Baltic governments blamed pro-Soviet groups including the Latvian and Lithuanian National Salvation Committees. The Lithuanian National Salvation Committee issued a propaganda press release that validated that explanation of events. The release denounced the Landsbergis government, said it would soon be ousted because of its inept style and its inability to govern, admittedly reaffirmed it should heed Mr. Gorbachev's advice, and vowed that Lithuania was and always would be part of the Soviet Union.
The next day Russian Federation leader Boris Yeltsin traveled to Tallinn, Estonia and met with representatives from all three Baltic governments. Russia, Latvia, and Estonia signed a hastily assembled agreement that condemned Soviet aggression. The parties agreed not to intervene in each other's internal affairs, and diplomatic recognition was implied. Lithuania's representatives were expected to sign the agreement, but because they had little confidence in its terms due to its rapid completion, they withheld signing it. On 13 January Mr. Yeltsin urged the assembled Soviet forces to consider the serious consequences of their actions to themselves and to others whose main goal was developing democracy by peaceful means.
His words and agreements were soon undermined. Later that same bleak Sunday the elite state security forces (the OMON or Black Berets) attacked. After brief battles with unarmed civilian defenders, thirteen people in Vilnius and six people in Riga lay dead. These events of the so-called "dark days of January" would not be soon forgot. Nor did these events strengthen support for Mr. Gorbachev among those who tried to carry out his chaotic orders.
For days after the crackdown, both sides waged a strange sort of propaganda war. On Leningrad television Aleksandr Nuserev (a journalist known to have links to the KGB) introduced the claim that those who were killed during the January incidents actually died of heart attacks. Radio Riga responded to the report by issuing a commentary that included the observation that: "People who die of heart attack do not leave blood splatters to the thirteenth floor". The response added that there was nothing so dishonorable as shooting at unarmed civilians. In the obviously spliced together Nuserev segment, the defenders were armed. In reality the Soviets held the only weapons.
By the time of the 19 - 21 August 1991 coup attempt, Soviet forces still in the Baltic states seemed ready for a real fight. Supported by various pro-Soviet groups and the commanders of the Baltic Military District (BMD), Soviet forces held all the strategic locations in the region. They blockaded the harbor in Tallinn; they cut all lines of communication in Vilnius; they tried to control the communications and government facilities in Riga. The BMD commander swore allegiance to the coup plotters and threatened to arrest all elected government ministers - beginning with Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunovs. The coup failed and the BMD commander was sent to another part of the Union before he could accomplish these tasks. On 23 August 1991 the LKP was declared unconstitutional.
Some exceptions exist to the vast generalization that Russians and indigenous Baltic peoples held different views of Baltic independence. Latvia could not have adopted its independence resolution without substantial support from the Russian population. Demographically Latvians and Russians comprise almost equal percentages of the country's population, so there is no clear majority versus minority conflict. At its essence, the deciding factor to support the independence referendum had more to do with future economic advantages than with ethnic alliances.
Its ethnic diversity makes Latvia more prone to ethnic strife, but during the early 1990s other factors were as likely to incite trouble along the Baltic. Mr. Landsbergis described the tension this way: "If the world accepts one country being oppressed by another, using aggression to establish some unjust status quo, then violence will rule the world - not the principles of democracy and justice". Other activists including members of now-banned pro-Soviet groups such as the National Salvation Committees believed the only path to order was the restoration of a revived and strong centralized Soviet-style dictatorship. These pro-Soviet groups denounced Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin as traitors. A hard-line military coup was to them the only viable option. In late 1991 and into 1992 several attempts were begun to oust the Gorbunovs/Godmanis government, but the efforts were thwarted at the planning stages. The pro-Soviet rhetoricians persisted with their perception that who governed in Moscow should determine who governed in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn. They always selectively ignored the 6 September 1991 declaration from the Soviet foreign ministry that officially conferred sovereignty and diplomatic recognition to the three Baltic states from the Soviet Union.