The Russian Army in 1854 - Part 2

Author: John Barham
Published on: Jun 30, 2000

Infantry offensive strategy was based on the tactical doctrine that victory in battle would be achieved by large numbers concentrated in dense columns. Their aim was to close with the enemy and overwhelm them in hand-to-hand fighting with the bayonet. The provision of firepower was the responsibility of skirmishers and artillery support.

Battle formations were geared to this concept. The skirmish line was generally deeper than the allies equivalent: there were 48 designated skirmishers per infantry company of 230 men. Its formations and firing procedures followed a strict drill, although the top six marksmen had discretion to engage opportunity targets, such as (enemy!) officers. A close quarter reserve was positioned 30 to 150 paces behind the open order 'active' line, depending on the terrain.

The main body of infantry typically advanced in Company Column, closely followed by Battalion Column, which was the main attack formation. It consisted of two parallel columns twelve ranks deep on a company-wide frontage of around 60 men. It was considered absolutely essential to the success of the attack that the column operate as an immaculately symmetrical precision unit. Therefore any rush or charge across intervening ground was totally unacceptable. The 1848 Officers' Drill Manual emphasised that the success of the column depended on the correct extension of the pointed toes whilst marching, and on platoon commanders setting the correct pace and number of steps to maintain barrack square dressing.

In view of this thinking it is understandable that most training time was spent on the drill square, mastering the distinctive parade step. To learn this, trainees had to stand on one leg with the other leg stretched out with toes pointed until the drill sergeant was satisfied that the whole squad was aligned in perfect symmetry - it could be many long minutes before the step was changed and the whole process started again with the other leg. Soldiers losing their balance or collapsing through cramp were immediately thrashed back to their feet. If an officer was present the drilling NCO was liable for a physical as well as verbal lashing in front of the squad. The parade step was the overriding criterion by which a unit's efficiency was judged. While most other armies spent time on field training, the Russians paraded. But even cynical foreign military attachés had to admit that the Russians were a superb sight at review.

Back in the 18th Century, the famous and arguably best ever Russian general Aleksander Suvorov had coined the truism 'The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a hero' although the truism he actually coined was a good deal snappier:'Pulya Du ra, Stoik geroy'.(stress the italic bits to get the rhythm). This maxim was still applied well into the 1880s, and according to one ex-Red Army officer, was even current in World War 2, albeit used ironically when times were tough and ammunition was running out. Certainly in the 1850s it was accepted without question, and time spent by the rank and file infantry musketeer on small arms training was minimal.

Even if a sceptical minority of officers wanted their men better trained, they were limited by the scarcity of powder and practice rounds - 10 per man per year in many regiments. If the men wanted more bullets they made them out of clay, risking damage to the rifle barrel. The standard of maintenance, and indeed of manufacture, was poor. Since muskets were carried on parade and at reviews, the barrels had to be shining, and they were polished until dangerously thin. The rare arms inspections often disclosed that a high proportion of the weapons were useless. Around the outbreak of war, inspectors pronounced unserviceable 534 out of a total 1318 Moscow Regiment muskets.

By 1854 converted flintlocks had all but disappeared from regular units, and the standard equipment was the smoothbore percussion musket, mainly the M1845. It had a range of 150-200 yds, and a rate of fire of one round a minute (half the British rate).

As might be expected, skirmishers and specialised riflemen received adequate training in small arms handling and firing. The M1854 rifled percussion musket with backsight was just coming into service, but at the start of the War was only available for elite marksmen.

The Russian Regular Cavalry numbered around 68,000 at full strength, although shortage of suitable horses was an ongoing problem and the 1854 figure was nearer 44,000. The Corps of Dragoons retained its traditional role as mounted infantry, fighting on foot after riding to the scene of the action. There were nine regiments, totalling 10,000. A traditional role was also reserved for the eight regiments of Cuirassiers, the heavy cavalry mounted on horses which were large by any standards, and hugely impressive on parade. There were around 1000 Cuirassiers per regiment. There were no less than thirty two light cavalry regiments, Ulan lancers and Hussars, actually able to muster around 800 horsemen each in the field.

The standard unit of cavalry was the squadron, roughly 100 strong. Much of the cavalry operated as a separate arm, but twenty four light cavalry regiments were allocated as Corps troops. Each of the six Corps had four light cavalry regiments, together designated a Division; for example 6 Light Cavalry Division was the corps cavalry of 6 Corps. Don't be confused by the other term 'division' used within Russian cavalry regiments for two squadrons operating together. It's just the cavalry making sure they were different, as always.

Cavalry training methods equated to the Infantry's. Precision movement in perfect order looked highly impressive at parades and reviews. The Dragoons dismounted, formed into Battalion Column and then remounted again all to the beat of a drum. And there was the same unhurried attitude to closing with the enemy as practised by the Army on foot. The tactical manuals taught combinations of line and column formations probably sufficient to cope competently with most battle situations, but these were always practised as precision drill, never under imaginative field training conditions. And the facts that many available horses were stunted in growth and underexercised, that the cavalrymen were often overweight and the horses overloaded all combined to slow things down even further.

And of course there were the Cossacks, with their horse regiments each of six 'sotnya' (hundred), although they also provided artillery and infantry units, with a generally better battle record than the horsemen in the course of the War. In peacetime they farmed in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. In mediaeval times these areas were the wild frontier where anything went, including runaway peasants from all parts of Russia. These were the Cossacks - the name meant 'piece workers' in old Russian; there was no Cossack race, it was a vocation, signifying a dedication to a free life in return for service. The Tsars had no money for a standing army and rewarded service with land. The Cossacks proved to be brilliant reconnaissance and early warning troops. Using techniques current in Special Forces to this day, they proved more than a match for the Tarters, usually masters of surprise, and for any other invaders from Central Asia. So they were often called up by the Tsar, and their farmlands expanded.

It was perhaps inevitable that over the years they would clash with the authorities over class privilege and civil rights; their two most charimatic leaders were Stefan Rasin in the 1660s and Emelian Pugachev in the 1770s. Both had led major rebellions which had rocked the Tsarist regime; both had ultimately failed and had been executed. The repression and loss of land and rights which the Cossacks had suffered in the mid 70s was almost within living memory - think of World War 1 viewed from today. Although they had honoured their obligation to fight for the Tsar in 1853, it was evident that they were not motivated to distinguish themselves in open warfare. Nonetheless the Don Cossacks in particular figured in battle.

The Russian Artillery was reliable and effective. It was efficiently handled, the gun drill quick and precise and the shooting accurate. Artillery officers came through cadet school followed by a further period of specialised study. It was accepted that the technical support arms should have the pick of the conscription intakes.

The basic artillery unit was the battery, with an all-up strength of about 300. It was equipped with six smoothbore brass muzzle-loaded guns and six howitzers. Ranges and rates of fire were similar to the allies. Heavy batteries had 12 pdr guns and 18 pdr howitzers - they supported foot brigades. Light cavalry supported horse brigades and had 6 pdr guns and 9 pdr howitzers. Around 170 rounds per gun, mainly roundshot and case, were carried on integral battery transport.

The Engineers were the favourites of the Tsar. Consequently the arm enjoyed high profile and status, and attracted high calibre well-educated officers. They kept up with modern developments and were the first to master an electrical detonation system for land mines, used to effect in the Crimea. Their reputation for creating effective fortifications, trench systems and field works would certainly be severely tested at Sevastapol.

Each Infantry Corps had a Sapper Battalion composed of 4 Companies and commanded by a Lieut Colonel. Their all up strength was around 700. They were definitely what we would call combat engineers - the 6th Sapper Battalion was to take over 100% casualties in the Crimea.

Provision of Services at Corps level was the responsibility of the Train Battalion, which had a similar organisation to the Sappers. Infantry and Cavalry regiments had their own Train, around 200 strong.

This article concludes our overview of the 1854 Armies. Shortly they would be locked in combat, and the potential strengths and shortcomings highlighted may become evident and/or significant as we follow their progress.

Illustration: Hussar, Ingermanland Regiment Artwork by Richard Geiger from Campaign 6, Balaclava 1854, reproduced by permission of Osprey Publishing Ltd (c) Osprey Publishing Ltd.

Sources

Curtiss J S 1965 The Russian Army under Nicholas I 1825-1855 Durham NC

Robert H G Thomas 1991 The Russian Army of the Crimean War 1854-56 Osprey Publishing Ltd

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