9/11 Commission
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» Lawhawk - Handling classified documents; Sandy Berger style
We have lots of military and defense industry workers as readers (and we like having them!), so it should be no surprise that I'm hearing from so many people who've dealt with classified materials in the past or currently. What's interesting is that these readers are -- to a person -- more furious about the Berger story than almost any other reader. It seems that the more you know about how these things work, the less plausible Berger's explanations are. Something to keep in mind throughout the day's coverage.According to my own sources, they confirm what Goldberg reports at National Review. Anyone who tried what Berger apparently did would be up on charges in a flash. There's a reason that classified documents are treated differently and special rules apply to how one reads and handles them - there are national security concerns, as well as maintaining the integrity of the system. Berger apparently ignored those rules, and created his own standards of conduct.
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - Re: Sandy Berger, missing documents, and lots of questions
In response to message posted by Lawhawk:http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/...
We'll grant that visions of a former National Security Adviser stuffing classified documents down his trousers or socks makes for good copy. But count us more interested in learning what's in the documents themselves than in where on his person Sandy Berger may have put them when he was sneaking them out of the National Archives.For the evidence suggests that the missing material cuts to the heart of the choice offered in this election: Whether America treats terrorism as a problem of law enforcement or an act of war.
Mr. Berger admits to having deliberately taken handwritten notes he'd made out of the Archives reading room. On the more serious charges involving the removal (and subsequent discarding) of highly classified documents--including drafts of a key, after-action memo Mr. Berger had himself ordered on the U.S. response to al Qaeda threats in the run-up to the Millennium--he maintains he did so "inadvertently."
There's only one way to clear away the political smoke: Release all the drafts of the review Mr. Berger took from the room.
If it's all as innocent as Mr. Berger's friends are saying, there's no reason not to make them public. But there are good reasons for questioning Mr. Berger's dog-ate-my-homework explanation. To begin with, he was not simply preparing for his testimony before the 9/11 Commission. He was the point man for the Clinton Administration, reviewing and selecting the documents to be turned over to the Commission.
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - 9/11 Commission Finds Blame Everywhere, Proposes Fixes
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/22/politi... - among those areas that the final report blames is the lack of Congressional oversight.Bush, Clinton, CIA, FBI, and all the other alphabet agencies involved in national security are faulted as well.
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - New video shows terrorists being searched prior to boarding
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/22/politi... - makes you feel a whole lot safer knowing that these guys were searched prior to boarding and that they did not uncover the knives used, though they would have been given back to the individuals since the pre-9/11 rules didn't require confiscation of knives taken on board.Surveillance video from Dulles International Airport the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, shows three of the five hijackers being pulled aside to undergo additional scrutiny after setting off metal detectors but then permitted to board the flight that later smashed into the Pentagon.Advertisement
The video shows an airport screener hand-checking the baggage of one hijacker, Nawaq Alhazmi, for traces of explosives before letting him continue to board American Airlines Flight 77 with his brother, Salem, a fellow hijacker, who did not set off the alarm.The disclosure of the video comes a day before release of the final report by the Sept. 11 commission, which is expected to include a detailed accounting of the events that day.
Details in the grainy video are difficult to distinguish. But an earlier report by the commission describing activities at Dulles is consistent with the men's procession through airport security as shown on the video.
No knives or other sharp objects are visible on the surveillance video. But investigators on the commission have said that the hijackers at Dulles were believed to be carrying utility knives in their pockets or in their luggage, which at the time was legal.
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - Reflection and Action
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/...The tragic results of these analytical and sharing failures are by now well known: Two of the hijackers' names should have been added to a terrorism watch list; the FBI didn't know what it had when it arrested Zacarias Moussaoui; the several failed attempts to kill or capture bin Laden were the result of inadequate focus on an underappreciated threat. The 9/11 Commission has provided the ultimate, authoritative verdict that our intelligence gathering and sharing system was not responsive to the threats America faces from abroad, and to the real and growing risks of terrorism in our own backyard.Now we know better. And yet the Commission's admirable recommendations, as my dialogue with the co-chairmen yesterday made clear, are far more tentative than their findings of fact. There will be no quick fixes. The process of reform must be cautious, deliberate, and long term. How big is this task? The intelligence community employs enough people to populate a mid-size U.S. city. It includes 15 separate agencies, each with unique and complex capabilities and missions critical to our security. Several of these missions are focused not on terrorism but on the not-yet eliminated threat of future war between nations. We cannot afford to degrade any of these capabilities as we restructure. Pushing the panic button, just as failing to move with dispatch, would be an egregious mistake.
The Commission report is not a lone voice but only the latest authoritative call for an intelligence overhaul. Several previous commissions and task forces, including the Bremmer, Hart-Rudman, and Gilmore commissions, recommended substantial reforms that went unheeded during the Clinton years. The Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate intelligence committees produced a highly critical report on pre-9/11 intelligence last year that got more, but not enough, attention. Far-sighted recommendations have yet to be implemented--in part because both the Executive and Congress have found them too hard to do.
It is certainly true that President Bush, a bedrock intelligence supporter, responded swiftly to the 9/11 attacks by sharply increasing the community budget and by establishing new units--such as the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the Terrorist Screening Center--to fuse data, integrate foreign and domestic analysis, and force collaboration across the agencies. Likewise, the Patriot Act removed obstacles for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to pursue terrorists, and added to their authorities to do the job. The Department of Homeland Security offered hope to first responders that they would be trained and equipped to prevent terrorist attacks, protect infrastructure, and respond effectively to an attack should one occur.
And it is also true, and worthy of our most profound respect, that our intelligence officers have responded to the nation's call to arms. We must never forget this. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other dangerous corners of the world where terrorists threaten us, our courageous intelligence operatives in the field have taken great risks, heroically captured or killed al Qaeda leaders, and thwarted numerous terrorist operations-- knowing that their president and their country stand behind them. We must continue to do so.
But there is a common thread in all of the critical reviews of our nation's intelligence, and in the wake of today's Commission report we ignore it at our peril. It is the lack of connectivity, interoperability, and information sharing across the agencies, especially between intelligence and law enforcement.
Good people failed repeatedly before 9/11 to get vital information to those who needed it. When information was shared, it was often too late for the recipients to take preventive action. Unfortunately, these same issues continue to complicate our efforts today, including the vitally important task of standing up the Department of Homeland Security. This new department's analysts need seamless access to their intelligence community counterparts, but long after 9/11 they are only now beginning to have it. Similar issues persist in other areas where improvements in federal, state, and local sharing are needed.
As the Commission report documents better than any effort to date, neither the president nor our country's dedicated intelligence professionals have been well served by the current structure of our intelligence community. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence earlier this month issued a scathing report on the performance of our intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, prior to the invasion of Iraq. Reliable clandestine sources and fresh information on Iraqi WMD were virtually nonexistent. Time-tested checks and balances were ignored. The lack of analytic rigor was pervasive. And, once again, coordination and collaboration across agencies was not up to the standard the president had set. At a minimum, it appears that existing structures and cultures set up good people to fail.
A few of the 9/11 Commission's proposals for reform in this area, however, miss the mark. The two principal recommendations--a mega national counterterrorism center, and an all-powerful intelligence czar--have not only been considered for decades, but seem especially unsuited to the goal of reducing bureaucracy. Increasing the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, another alternative currently under consideration, could similarly achieve the desired budgetary and programmatic integration without adding another layer of management and interposing a new official between the president and the information collectors and analysts.
To get this job done right, Congress will need thoughtful reflection and quality time, not breast-beating and a rush to action. And the president must be allowed to lead the transformation of the intelligence community, not least because Congress will first have to get its own house in order if it is to provide the effective oversight that will be essential to success in any reorganized future. As Lee Hamilton put it to our House Leadership yesterday, our Congressional oversight of intelligence is the best in the world--but it is not as good as it needs to be. The 9/11 Commission report recommends a tight bicameral oversight committee that will integrate the review of both foreign and domestic intelligence. Whatever the disposition of this specific proposal, it will stimulate a healthy debate among members of Congress that will help us change the status quo and improve oversight.
The Commission also recommends the establishment of permanent House and Senate authorizing committees for the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland jurisdiction in both chambers, the Commission observes, is now spread across multiple committees and subcommittees, needlessly diffusing authority and responsibility. In making its recommendation for reform, the Commission is endorsing Speaker Hastert's decision in early 2003 to establish the Select Committee on Homeland Security, which I chair. My experience in attempting to collaborate with nine committees of jurisdiction in order to enact legislation on first responders, cybersecurity, emergency communications interoperability, port, aviation, and rail security, border security, and similar issues has convinced me that without a committee that is principally responsible for homeland security, congressional action will be well-nigh impossible.
The Commission's report will also provide needed balance in the discussion of the Patriot Act. It provides a ringing endorsement of the law's provisions to tear down the "wall" between law enforcement and intelligence. And it unanimously supports updating the wiretapping and surveillance laws for the digital age.
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - Direct Link To Actual Report
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911... - hopefully they'll have this mirrored to numerous servers since it is a huge pdf report.-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - How to read the report
http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/m...Finally, there is the basis for the commission's fact-finding to consider. Less than two weeks ago, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a blistering critique of the CIA and the U.S. intelligence community. How much of what the commission says it has learned comes from this source? The commission, for example, has previously discounted the possibility that chief hijacker Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague five months before the 9/11 attacks. Did the commission interview the eyewitness directly? Or is it relying on an assessment by the intelligence community? If it's the latter (it is — bet on it), how much hard information is that based on? We know we had no good sources in Iraq. Why should we think this is not more of the same discredited intelligence community "group think" and unsupported theorizing we heard about two weeks ago?If the 9/11 Commission's work is so vital, and the commission freely relies on the intelligence community, and we are told we should accept that, then why do we keep hearing that the intelligence community needs radical reformation? Will the commission explain Atta's pair of 2000 trips to Prague — right before he left for the U.S. to begin preparing for the 9/11 attacks? What will it have to say about Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, the likely Iraqi operative who escorted at least one hijacker (Khalid al-Midhar) to a 9/11 planning meeting in Kuala Lampur in January 2000? — a meeting the intelligence community knew about but over which it somehow forgot to put al-Midhar (and his sidekick, Nawaf al-Hazmi) on the terrorist watch list that would have kept him out of our country.
The commissioners and their staff are comprised of some smart, dedicated, earnest people. What they find after all this careful study should not be dismissed out of hand. But there's reason to be highly skeptical. Oh, and did I mention that the Democratic National Convention starts Monday?
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - More on Berger's puzzling behavior at the archives
http://www.news-leader.com/today/0722-Gu...If true, this report is damning, not just of Berger, the former NSA, but of those monitors who were supposed to safeguard the documents in their care.
-- posted by Lawhawk
» Lawhawk - Commission finds NYC anti-terror funding woefully inadequate
http://www.nypost.com/news/regionalnews/...-- posted by Lawhawk
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