India - Pakistan Crisis

Hamid Karzai Moves From Lightweight To Heavyweight In Afghan Politics - Foreign Policy in Focus - 12/12/01

Top 206. Mar 23, 2002 9:11 AM

» JenL_2 - Ahmed Rashid - Pakistani Journalist

Betty, Steven, or anyone - have you read Ahmed Rashid? He lives in Lahore and seems to be a foremost authority on Afghanistan & Pakistan in the West. Wonder how much the Pak Gov/ISI applies censorship through intimidation to Ahmed Rahid, if at all? This from 3/21 Asia Source:

<img src="http://www.asiasource.org/graphics/ahmed..." width=150 height=155 align="left">Q&A Asia Source Interview - Ahmed Rashid

Ahmed Rashid is the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Daily Telegraph, London, and has written extensively on the region for the last twenty years.

In Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Mr Rashid warned the international community to ignore Afghanistan at its peril. This book became a New York Times bestseller shortly after September 11th.

In this interview, Mr Rashid discusses his new book Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia and the explosive situation unfolding in the region today. He also explains the role of other important regional actors like Pakistan and the impact of the US war in Afghanistan.

There appears to be some consensus among people familiar with Afghanistan that more Taliban would have defected if there had been a political entity for them to defect to (that is, if the interim administration had been established prior to a military campaign). Why do you think this is the case and where instead have the Taliban gone?

Pakistan was trying to delay the start of the bombing for as long as possible because it believed that the Taliban would split and there would be defections, but my impression was that the Taliban leadership was so closely tied in with bin Laden -- and with the aims of bin Laden -- and so tightly controlled and disciplined by Mullah Omar that such defections would not have occurred

What could have happened if the bombing had been delayed was better preparation by the Americans and the Pakistanis for the Pashtun belt in the south of the country. Then you would not have had the chaotic situation that exists today where a lot of the Pashtun governors and tribal leaders are giving only nominal support to Hamid Karzai and the interim government. There would also not have been such large pockets of Taliban and Al-Qaeda still being able to set up bases the way they are.

So I really think that the failure of US policy was really the lack of political preparation in the Pashtun belt; even today there is no political strategy there because the warlords are being funded and armed by the Americans and they are not cleaning up their acts or expressing great loyalty to the central government. This is clearly undermining the authority of the Karzai administration.

As far as the Taliban are concerned, I think many of the rank-and-file have gone home to their villages, while others have gone into Pakistan. The bulk of the leadership is now in Pakistan (those who were not caught or arrested by the Americans) and they are all lying low there. They have contacts, they have refuge with the Islamic parties as well as with former intelligence officials, and they are lying low like so many other militant parties in the region.

You have emphasized elsewhere the need for a reconstruction plan that would focus on the region, rather than just on Afghanistan. You suggest that there is an area of instability that includes the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Baluchistan in Pakistan, the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan and Seistan in Iran. What kind of instability do you see in these areas and what kind of a reconstruction plan would be needed to counteract it?

<img src="http://www.asiasource.org/graphics/jihad..." width=150 height=226 align="right">These are areas where Islamic militancy is strongest. These are also areas which have been economically completely neglected by their own regimes, and by the international community. I think it is the classic case of a combination of poverty, growing unemployment, and the youth bulge fuelling and spurring on extremism.

These areas need a comprehensive economic plan formulated and implemented by the international community and, of course, by individual regimes in the region. The Central Asian regimes do not take the Ferghana Valley seriously; that has been half the problem. They do not believe that there is an economic crisis or an unemployment crisis in Ferghana whereas, in fact, there is something like 90 per cent unemployment there. So the regimes have to take these areas seriously.

A comprehensive, integrated plan, perhaps spearheaded by one of the big multilateral agencies like the World Bank, is needed. WE need to keep in mind that the problems in these areas are very similar even though one is dealing with different ethnic groups, different languages, and different cultures.

In your book, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, you discuss the increasing appeal of the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT; the Party of Islamic Liberation) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and argue that they constitute a serious threat to the region. Their adherents derive inspiration from the Taliban and the extreme Wahhabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia, and were trained in militant madrassas in Pakistan.

You say, as well, that in Kabul in September 2000, the Taliban, the IMU, the HT, Chechen separatists, and bin Laden met and held talks about future cooperation.

Given both the demographics of the region as well as the increasing political repression these groups face in Central Asia, you argue that they are likely to grow in strength and numbers. What should the US and the international community do to prevent this from happening?

First of all, the campaign in Afghanistan has certainly hit the militant arms of the IMU and the Hizb ut-Tahrir; in other words, the fighters who were in Afghanistan, their source of money, weapons and supplies, as well as the drugs trade, have all been hit very badly. But their networks in Central Asia itself have not been touched at all. The IMU is reorganizing in Central Asia as is Hizb ut-Tahrir. Both organizations have a new slogan now which is basically anti-Americanism.

They feel that over the medium- and long-term, they will be able to mobilize greater popular support because the Americans now have bases in three countries in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). The Americans will be seen to be propping up dictatorial regimes and not pushing them hard enough to carry out economic and social reforms.

The danger is still very much that these groups are not going to diminish or disappear in Central Asia; they are going to continue to exist and may in fact grow in strength.

Now what can be done? What is going to be needed is very serious economic and political reform within these countries, particularly President Karimov's Uzbekistan. Karimov was in Washington last week and signed a security pact with the US, in which, for the first time, there was some mention of the fact that he has to carry out political and economic reforms. I think this is a step forward, but the US is not stipulating any kind of reform as a condition for any Central Asian country receiving an aid package. To some extent, the aid has to be conditional on greater democratization and greater economic reforms; that is, measures that will address unemployment and other problems in the area and that will also allow a political process to evolve.

You have also argued that the US military campaign in Afghanistan has exacerbated the situation since both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have cooperated with the Americans and have at the same time become more repressive and authoritarian with Muslims at home. What are the implications of this in the long-term?

<img src="http://www.asiasource.org/graphics/talib..." width=150 height=234 align="left"> I think there was an explosive situation in Central Asia even before September 11th; I think that explosive situation still remains.

One purpose of my writing this book was to give a warning to everyone, just as I did in the Taliban book, that the Taliban regime was heading for a catastrophe which would upset the entire balance of power in the region. This book is giving the same warning: there is an extremely explosive situation in these areas which is not being tackled and what it needs is a political and economic strategy. It is not good enough for the US to guarantee these regimes security by giving them military training and military aid; what is needed from the international community is a comprehensive political strategy which will take into account the extremely volatile demographic, ethnic and political situation in Central Asia which is fuelling extremism. Since September 11th, none of these issues have gone away; in fact they have probably been exacerbated.

Pakistan's support seems to have been critical to the Taliban, not least because Pakistan wanted to use Afghanistan as a base to train militants for Kashmir. There are many things that point to continuing sympathy with the Taliban within the Pakistan security and intelligence community, despite the regime's formal backing of the war: the removal of top ISI generals directly before the American military operation, the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, and most recently, the attack on the church in the diplomatic enclave in Islamabad.

How much sympathy do you think there is in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment for the Taliban? Given these lasting sympathies, how reliable a coalition partner is the Musharraf regime in the so-called war against terrorism?

Unfortunately, the Musharraf regime has not carried out the promised crackdown on these militant groups that it had pledged to do after his January 12th speech. The 2,000 militants who were caught have all been freed, none of them have been charged with anything, and the leadership is now free.

Out of the extremist groups who were banned, hardly anyone has been caught and certainly no one has been charged for the sectarian killings these groups were involved in (several top businessmen and many foreigners in Pakistan have been murdered since September 11th). So we are seeing a very weak response: the performance of Musharraf does not match the rhetoric of Musharraf. This is clearly exacerbating the situation.

There is still support among some sections of the military for the Taliban. But more important than that, there is a very powerful group of retired and serving intelligence officers who have, over the last 20 years, built up very effective grids with each other and with militant groups, and are fuelling these extremist groups even now. Nothing has been done to stop them, especially the retired officers, who are giving simply outrageous statements which are undermining Musharraf's attempts to crack down on these groups. But the army refuses to discipline these generals; there are very senior retired generals from the Pakistan army who are making scandalous remarks which are fuelling extremist sentiment in the country and confirming the impression that there are anti-Western grids within the military.

But do you think the Americans are aware of this? And if they are, what are they doing about it?

Unfortunately the new American relationship with Pakistan has become too dependent on one man too quickly. I think Musharraf's visit to Pakistan last month demonstrated that; there was lots of praise for Musharraf but nothing was said about Pakistan (no word about the need for institutional building in Pakistan, no praise for the Pakistani people who have been supporting the crackdown on extremism, etc.). Unfortunately the relationship has been dominated by dependence on one man.

We have seen this before in American foreign policy: with people like the Shah of Iran, for instance, and even now, in Central Asia, with Karimov in Uzbekistan. It is much easier for the Americans to deal with one man but this is not an effective policy. These countries need institution-building procedures which will of necessity go beyond dependence on one man. We are not seeing that process; it almost appears as though the American administration is having a love affair with Musharraf but has no time for Pakistan, the country, or its people.

To turn to issues in Afghanistan: you have said that the Northern Alliance seems to dominate the interim administration since their representatives are in charge of the most important ministries (defence, interior and foreign). This has created resentment within the administration and accusations that they are staffing their offices with other Panjsheris and Northern Alliance loyalists. What effect, if any, is this likely to have on the outcome of the loya jirga in June? How credible do you think the conclusions of the loya jirga will be?

First of all, I think the most difficult and problematic issue in Afghanistan's domestic politics is precisely this: the overwhelming role of the Panjsheris within the interim government is creating enormous resentment, hatred and disunity. I was in Kabul a few days ago and had very frank talks with all three leading Panjsheri ministers and told them that this is a suicidal policy that they are carrying out. It is undermining not only the interim government but their own future. Other ethnic groups are seeing this as the Panjsheris replacing, if you like, the Kandahari Taliban, who also constructed a very narrowly based power structure which was not inclusive of other ethnic groups. I think this is a major problem which they will have to tackle before the loya jirga.

At the same time, I am very optimistic since the loya jirga commission is doing a marvelous job and is reaching out to all sorts of people. It is made up of some very impressive neutral intellectual figures. They will very soon publish the rules and agenda for the loya jirga. I think the loya jirga is going to take place, and it will be very broadly representative, because they will make sure it is. There will be huge representation from women, much more than we expect, as from professionals and émigré groups.

The loya jirga will be broadly representative but the really critical issue is going to be the formation of the next government, that is, the two-year transitional government that will come out of the loya jirga. What is going to be the role of the Panjsheris in that? Are they going to accept the kind of demotion that will be necessary in order to make the government fully representative? I think this is something that the international community, and of course, Hamid Karzai, have to tackle. The Americans do not as yet have a strategy for that either.

Hamid Karzai has not been able to build a constituency with Pashtuns, among whom you say warlordism is rampant. You also suggest that this warlordism is being fueled by the Americans who have funded these warlords to hunt down Al-Qaeda fighters but have not pressured them to be loyal to the central government. Do you think this suggests that the Americans are not interested in the long-term stability of the country and that once they have what they want from Afghanistan, they will simply leave as they did previously?

No, I think the Americans are interested in the long-term stability of Afghanistan but the lack of a political strategy is a reflection of the power struggles and debates going on in Washington between the State Department and the Pentagon. Unfortunately, the Pentagon is still running the show, it is still determining Afghan policy, and it is running the war on terrorism.

The point is that we are at a different stage in Afghanistan now, where the political strategy and the aid strategy have to be as important as hunting down Al-Qaeda. USAID [United States Agency for International Development], for example, has been relegated to the bottom of the pile of US agencies in Kabul. USAID should now be a major player in assisting not only the reconstruction effort but also future politics in the country, just as the State Department should also be a major player.

Unfortunately, however, the balance has not shifted since the war started in October. Of course, the Pentagon had to run the war between October and December but now the political balance inside the country has shifted and it is very important that this debate in Washington ends with a better political strategy for Afghanistan. This political strategy cannot be pursued by the Pentagon; it needs diplomats, aid officials and other people to formulate and run it.

You have elsewhere repeatedly stressed the importance of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) being expanded into four or five other cities in Afghanistan apart from Kabul. Could you explain why you think this is so important?

First of all, this has been demanded by 99 per cent of the Afghan population. I think it would demonstrate a major commitment by the international community, since it pledged to do this in Bonn, but has not yet carried it out. It would guarantee security for the loya jirga, which is very important so that people can send their real representatives, and thereby reduce the power of the warlords.

Also the real reconstruction and development effort, as opposed to the humanitarian work, can only be guaranteed when there is, for at least six months to a year, an international presence in other major Afghan cities. A number of NGOs, for instance, are not able to operate in Kandahar or in Mazar-e-Sharif at the moment, because of the security situation. Once ISAF is in place, however, this will of course change.

You have also argued that Afghanistan's public sector should not grow out of proportion (that is, there should be a small army, small bureaucracy, etc.) and that instead emphasis should be placed on private initiatives, which should have minimal restrictions placed on them. Why do you place so much emphasis on the private sector?

The Afghan state, for the coming 10 to 15 years, is not going to have the revenues to sustain a large state structure. The new Afghanistan is without a doubt going to have to be a decentralized Afghanistan. This means in political terms giving much greater power to the regions, to minorities and to other ethnic groups. Political decentralization will also, of necessity, mean economic decentralization.

The private sector will of course have to be monitored and have rules of behavior but Afghanistan is not a country that can afford a huge state sector. Already there are 270,000 Afghan civil servants who have not been paid for the last several months.

A Pakistani official you quoted in an article you wrote for FEER shortly after 9/11 said, "Bombing Afghanistan and bin Laden will just be lopping off the top of the tree, it will not be taking out all the branches, which are everywhere." Do you think this justifies military intervention in Iraq or other countries thought to be harbouring terrorists or supporting terrorist activities against the United States?

First of all, I would like to emphasize that I am extremely critical of this so-called "axis of evil" because I feel that this is an extension of US foreign policy and US likes and dislikes. This has very little to do with the war against terrorism. The US is attempting to internationalize its own foreign policy agenda by incorporating everything under the war on terrorism.

Iran is not the enemy of Europe or of Japan, so you obviously cannot equate Iran with, say, the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, the way Bush has done.

I think this has been the real tragedy: the unilateralism of the Bush Administration in its first six months is coming back into focus and once again US interests are taking precedence over all else.

As far as Iraq in particular is concerned, if the Americans kill Saddam Hussein, there is no doubt that the nature of the regime would change quite dramatically. But this is not to say that I support military intervention in Iraq because it has nothing at all to do with the war on terrorism. The war against terrorism has credibility because it is not a unilateral effort and operates with some degree of international participation.

Interview conducted by Nermeen Shaikh of AsiaSource.

More by Ahmed Rashid:

Osama Bin Laden: How the U.S. Helped Midwife a Terrorist - Public-i.org - 11/13/01

China forced to expand role in Central Asia - Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst - July 19, 2000

The Taliban: Exporting Extremism - Foreign Affairs, November/December, 1999

.....Jen

-- posted by JenL_2

Top 207. Mar 23, 2002 12:49 PM

» Steven_Russell - Re: Ahmed Rashid - Pakistani Journalist

In response to message posted by JenL_2:

Iran is not the enemy of Europe or of Japan, so you obviously cannot equate Iran with, say, the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, the way Bush has done.

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Why is Iran only OUR enemy?? That makes little sense, unless Europe and Japan are safely buffered simply because they are not the top economic forces in the world. From what I have read, Iran is THE major exporter of global terrorism. The solution may not be one of bombs, over political support for a popular uprising there, but it certainly is more than just a US problem.

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Baloney, typical fuzzy-thinking anti-American elitism. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is the next biggest threat to the region, and consequently to the developed world's economic interests. The coalition of "international participation" will be less than worthless if Iraq achieves military dominance, particularly with exportation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Iraq today continues to defy a decade-old UN resolution on weapons inspection, and Saddam thus spits in the face of such impotent "international participation".

Iraq also continues to harbor the terrorist Abdul Rahman Said Yasin, an Iraqi government employee, and one of the key links to the 1993 WTC bombing, one of the FBI's 22 Most Wanted Terrorists.

If the world does not get on board with the US against Iraq, then "international participation" will mean nothing, because a Weapon of Mass Destruction will originate or develop out of that country, and it WILL be used. That development will upset global economies like we have never seen.

The wider world can turn its blind eye to this threat today, but they will pay for it later in a huge way.

-- posted by Steven_Russell

Top 208. Mar 23, 2002 1:29 PM

» JenL_2 - Re: Ahmed Rashid - Pakistani Journalist

In response to message posted by Steven_Russell:

Thanks for your comments Steven - I agree with you....I think we do need to listen to what the rest of the world is saying....but then do what we have to do regardless of world opinion. We can't run a war by world consensus.

What amazes me is that Ahmed Rashid, a well-known Pakistani journalist living in Lahore, gets by making comments about Musharraf, the Pak military, ISI and extremist groups, while other journalists in Pakistan like Kamran Khan have been threatened and stabbed, and some, like Daniel Pearl, abducted & savagely murdered.....Jen

-- posted by JenL_2

Top 209. Mar 23, 2002 2:53 PM

» BPyles - Books and other things

Jen:

Ahmed Rashid, author. No, haven't read any of his books but am sure have read some of his articles. See he writes for London Daily Telegraph and I usually check it daily. From reading his responses to interview, do not think I will be reading it either. I get the impression that he is saying if we supplied the entire world with the same standard of living/freedoms that we have, then none of this terrorism bit would have happened. That is an old line, used by many countries and just a little tiresome. Was also turned off by his response about delaying the bombing to allow more defections from the Taleban. HA HA....would have allowed more to escape.

Would also be afraid his writings would be all with the approval of the different groups that seem to have Pakistan under their control. If he has worked for 20 years without being beheaded, then he must be writing approved material.

Speaking of books, finished Holy Wars, Inc. It was fair. Didn't give any inside info about what made OBL what he is, just same old tiresome excuses - our policy in Mideast, the invasion of the infidels in the Arabian States, yada yada....

Am about half way through Bin Laden - Behind the Mask of the Terrorist, by Adam Robinson. It promises to be much better as covers his early childhood and am now up to his move to Sudan. It is sad to read about all the work he did there, many farms with millions of acres (of course the President of Sudan gave it all to him in exchange for part ownership which netted him millions) and all the work it provided for so many people in Sudan. OBL was using his profits to fund his al-Qaeda but the poor natives working on the farms were probably using their salaries for food, shelter, etc. Such a tragedy that OBL did not use his money and organizational skills for legitimate concerns. Just might have brought some of the third-world countries up a notch or two.

-- posted by BPyles

Top 210. Mar 23, 2002 3:20 PM

» JenL_2 - Re: Books and other things

In response to message posted by BPyles:

Betty - You said....

If he has worked for 20 years without being beheaded, then he must be writing approved material.

...Sad but true!....Jen

-- posted by JenL_2

Top 211. Mar 25, 2002 6:57 PM

» BPyles - Pakistan - our friend

Dawn, Pakistan 3-25-02

Government denies Afghanistan-bound British troops permission to land:

BAGRAM AIR BASE, March 25:

British troops have been refused permission to land on Pakistani soil and may have to find an different route to reach Afghanistan, a British army spokesman said today. Hundreds of marines are waiting to offshore in the Arabian Sea on board HMS Ocean. It is understood the ship was hoping to dock in the southern Pakistan port of Karachi, but so far permission has been denied by Islamabad. If the British government does not persuade Pakistan to change its mind, the troops, who make up a large proportion of a 1,700-strong force, will be forced to land in another country further away from their intended destination. "At present negotiations are still going on with Pakistan to use that route in," Marines spokesman Sergeant Steve Melbourne told reporters here. (AFP) (Posted @ 12:50 PST)
------------------

Pakistan's Tribal Areas - seems their claim to fame is having turned away Alexander The Great - wonder if he had A-10 Thunderbolts, Warthogs or a daisy cutter?

Hindustan, 3-25-02

Pak tribal chiefs warn US The New York Times (Peshawar, March 25)

Tribal leaders from the treacherous mountainous areas along the border with Afghanistan have an unambiguous message for American commanders who have suggested that they might enter the region in pursuit of Al-Qaeda fighters: Don't.

One tribal leader said that tribal elders saw America as the enemy and that his people would sacrifice their lives to keep American soldiers off their land.

A more moderate leader, a well-educated man, said more calmly that no foreigner may go into the tribal areas without permission. That warning must be taken seriously; ages ago, Alexander the Great was turned back, and for the last 53 years, until December, no soldiers, not even Pakistanis, were allowed in.

In separate interviews, the tribal leaders, Pashtun Muslims, expressed other views the Bush administration would certainly find discouraging: that the core of American policy is a hatred of Muslims and that Osama bin Laden was not responsible for the September 11 attacks.

The war in Aghanistan will drag on for a long time if the tribal areas, which share a porous 450-mile border with Afghanistan, become a safe haven for Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters to rest and regroup. This is exactly what American officials believe the fighters are doing, because men from those regions poured into Afghanistan to fight early in the war.

-- posted by BPyles

Top 212. Mar 27, 2002 9:02 AM

» JenL_2 - Re: Daniel Pearl case

Another editorial on the Daniel Pearl case in 3/20 Boston Globe, by someone who knows of what he speaks:

Shadow over Pakistan

By Husain Haqqani

THE TERRORIST attack in an Islamabad church that killed five worshippers, including two Americans, and the barbaric murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl are just the tip of the iceberg. Pakistan's transition from an ally of extremist Islamists to a modern Muslim state will not come without a fight. If Pakistani officials had responded to the activities of chief suspect Sheik Ahmed Omar Saeed or to US requests last November for his arrest and extradition, Pearl might still be alive.

Until Sept. 11, successive Pakistani governments quietly encouraged volunteer militias organized in the name of Jihad, hoping they would accelerate the freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. General Pervez Musharraf must now contend with covert operations of these groups against his own authority.

His vision of Pakistan as a moderate state won't be achieved until his government confronts the past that glorified the likes of Sheik Omar in an all-out assault against lawless militant groups, even if that exposes links between these groups and previous government policies. Otherwise, individuals like Sheik Omar will continue to operate in the shadows.

Given Pakistan's Islamic ethos, the country cannot be expected to emulate Kemal Ataturk's Turkey. But it certainly needs to deal with individuals and groups that think beheading an American journalist somehow advances the cause of Islam.

Take the case of Sheik Omar. He came to Pakistan after his release from Indian imprisonment for hijacking an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar in December 1999. He apparently moved around with ease between Afghanistan and Pakistan, helping his mentor, Maulana Masood Azhar, to organize a new militant group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, which has only recently been banned by Musharraf. Masood Azhar was himself released on demand of the same hijackers along with Sheik Omar.

Given that both were released as a result of a terrorist act, neither should have enjoyed the freedom to move about organizing a new militant movement. Jaish-e-Muhammad drew most of its members from another outfit, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which had been accused of kidnapping American and British citizens in India. Two years ago at a news conference in the Pakistani-controlled side of Kashmir, members of Harkat proudly displayed severed heads allegedly belonging to Indian troops as proof of a ''successful militant operation.''

Sheik Omar's track record, and the brutality of displaying severed heads as trophies, should have caused alarm in Islamabad's corridors of power. It did not. Just weeks ago the government suggested that Sheik Omar and his associates might be acting at India's behest to embarrass Pakistan by kidnapping Pearl. If so, all the more reason for Pakistan to have arrested Sheik Omar and his cohorts in Harkat and Jaish.

It's not too late to crack down on these extremists. Those who sever human heads, target civilians, attack places of worship, and are not soldiers in a national army must not be allowed to take refuge behind any cause, including Kashmiri self-determination.

Moreover, the government itself has much to do to get the house in order. Every Pakistani government corrupted the legal system and committed crimes against private citizens.

Pictures of Daniel Pearl in captivity reminded me of my own abduction by Pakistan's civilian intelligence agency three years ago, ostensibly at the behest of Saifur Rahman, the ''accountability czar'' of Nawaz Sharif's government. I was wrapped in a blanket at gunpoint in the middle of Rawalpindi, then blindfolded, chained, and beaten for three days and nights in an underground dungeon. Their purpose was to intimidate me and stop my criticism in the press of the increasingly authoritarian prime minister, whom I had advised in his previous tenure. All this was done by a supposed law-enforcing agency.

After the change of government, those responsible for my kidnapping and torture were suspended from service, only to be reinstated later, thanks to the ''old boy network'' within the intelligence community. Other Pakistani journalists endured similar abduction and treatment by members of the security services.

Many Pakistanis and foreigners alike are pinning their hopes on Musharraf's ability to deal with extremists and restore rule of law. But it all depends on his ability to purge Pakistan's establishment of its previous patterns and find ways to air the secrets of a dark past.

Otherwise these demons will periodically return to haunt us all, as Sheik Omar seems to be doing.

Husain Haqqani has served as an adviser to prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan's ambassador to Sri Lanka.

Yup - have made similar comments before on this thread - IMHO a complete Pak housecleaning is in order - they can't continue sweeping their dirty secrets under the carpet and go on business as usual....Jen

-- posted by JenL_2

Top 213. Mar 27, 2002 11:52 AM

» BPyles - Reform

Jen: Will just have to continue hope that some of the people in Pakistan (hopefully a whole lot) will demand that reforms be made...

Here is an article about a young Pakistanian who was living the good life from all appearances, decided to do his own jihad and blow up a Florida power plant, got caught, FBI declined to prosecute on "technical" reasons, INS going to deport. Now what on earth will that solve? Guess he will be a trip home paid for by US taxpayers...we should have zero tolerance for other family members...send them all home...bet junior might think twice before he jihads.
----------------------

INS links Hollywood man to plot to blow up FPL plant

By Judith Miller
The New York Times

March 26, 2002

Federal immigration officials have arrested and are seeking to deport a young Pakistani
immigrant from Hollywood who they say plotted last spring to blow up the Florida Power & Light Co. plant at Port Everglades and other sites in South Florida, law enforcement officials said on Monday.

The officials said that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, supported by police in
Florida, arrested Imran Mandhai, 19, about a month ago as he was returning to his apartment from an Islamic center in Pembroke Pines. They said Mandhai, who lives in Hollywood with his parents, conspired last March and April with others, whom they declined to identify, to acquire guns and explosives for a jihad against the United States.

The officials said that one of Mandhai's targets was the FPL plant near the Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and that he had planned to bomb it on April 27, 2001. They declined to say why the plot failed.

Patricia Mancha, the immigration service spokeswoman in Miami, confirmed that Mandhai was in custody, but she would not say when he had been arrested or whether or how soon the agency would start deportation proceedings.

The man's father, Muhammad Farooq Mandhai, an accountant, said that his son had done nothing wrong. He said his son was in the Krome Detention Center in Miami, where illegal immigrants are often held. He described Imran Mandhai as an excellent college student who worked hard, got good grades, and wanted a career in computers. He said his son was in his second year in computer sciences at Broward Community College.

Law enforcement officials and associates of Imram Mandhai, however, painted a more ominous portrait of him. The local police and other law enforcement officials said Mandhai became disenchanted with American life and was attracted to militant Islamic politics soon after he arrived in the United States in April 1998.

In the spring of 2001, an FBI informant reported that Mandhai was trying to organize a jihad in South Florida to bomb electrical power stations and other sites. Mandhai, law enforcement officials said, told some associates that he had received training from a man he identified only as "the marine" on how to make bombs.

Officials said that in April 2001, Mandhai discussed the importance of jihad with seven Arab men, whom they refused to identify, at a meeting in Miramar. That month, they said, he also tried to buy an AK-47 assault rifle at a gun show in Fort Lauderdale for $300 but his credit card was rejected.

It is not known whether Mandhai succeeded in making a bomb or whether he even bought components for one.

A spokesman for the FBI in Miami declined to discuss the case, or say whether anyone else had been detained or questioned.

FBI officials in Washington suggested that the Justice Department might still bring charges against Mandhai or others, but officials in Florida said the case had been turned over to the immigration agency after Justice Department lawyers declined to prosecute Mandhai because of "technical" problems with the case.

One official said nothing indicated that Mandhai or his plot was connected to Osama bin
Laden's al-Qaida or the Sept. 11 attacks. The official said investigators spent months following Mandhai's movements and associates, and this was why it took so long to arrest him.

The elder Mandhai said his family, which also includes his wife and a younger son and daughter, immigrated legally from Karachi about four years ago.

Mandhai and others confirmed that Imran attended the Darul Uloom Islamic Institute in
Pembroke Pines.

Imran Mandhai's lawyer, Nashid Sabir, did not return calls seeking comment.

-- posted by BPyles

Top 214. Mar 27, 2002 12:11 PM

» JenL_2 - Re: Reform

In response to message posted by BPyles:

Betty - incredible story - and to think it all happened long before 9/11! Sounds to me like Mandhai and his cohorts would be good candidates for the US military tribunal system rather than deportation. And damnit if they won't talk - we'll make 'em talk!!

Mandhai attended the Darul Uloom Islamic Institute in Pembroke Pines ..... the two guys with the possible foiled suicide bombing attack on Israel reported on the "Israel-Palestinian Crisis" thread attended The Islamic Saudi Academy in Arlington, VA
http://www.suite101.com/discussion.cfm/i...

We need to start taking a long hard look at Islamic schools within our borders - we can't let our freedoms of association, speech, religion....become a breeding ground for terrorism!.....Jen

-- posted by JenL_2