Books on Investing: Discussions, Reports &amp; Suggestions

Top 127. Aug 24, 2004 12:52 PM

» Normxxx - Re: Re: Mandelbrot: Chaos RULES

In response to message posted by bob90245:

I haven't really read it yet, but as I understand it, he is just saying that the use of 'traditional' models, such as normality of distribution, assumption of independence, EMT, etc. are very inappropriate models of market behavior. I would assume that he would try to apply Chaos Models, but I think at this point he is doing it only to show that there may be better, alternate theories. If you are familiar with Chaos Theory, you know that even if it can completely describe an event, it may not provide useable predictions within our margin of error or our lifetime.

At this point, I think he is only concerned to establish that markets are far more risky and unpredictable than 'standard' theory says they are. As he points out, this is something that all academics now accept, but choose to ignore in practise.

Current theory says that markets are not predictable (being random at their heart), but do obey the laws of classical statistics. The analogy here would be with sub-atomic particles whose behavior, too, is random, but obey the laws of quantum mechanical statistics, allowing physicists and engineers to do many and wonderful things.

I suspect Mandelbrot is saying that if the market is chaotic, then it might be determinate, but much less predictable than the use of classical statistics would allow!

-- posted by Normxxx

Top 128. Sep 22, 2004 6:33 AM

» Kirk - 2005 Stock Trader's Almanac

<img SRC=http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0471649368.01._PE32_PI_SCMZZZZZZZ_.jpg width=117 height=169 align=left>Stock Trader's Almanac 2005

by Jeffrey and Yale Hirsch.

Edition: Hardcover

Published every year since 1967, Stock Trader's Almanac is a practical investment tool with a wealth of information organized in a calendar format. It alerts readers to little-known market patterns and tendencies to help market participants forecast market trends with accuracy and confidence. The data in the Almanac is some of the cleanest in the business, and its analyses are relied upon by savvy professionals, from well-known money managers to journalists. Stock Trader's Almanac 2005 encapsulates all the historical price information on the stock market, provides monthly and daily reminders, and alerts users to seasonal opportunities as well as dangers.

"Jeff Hirsch is following in the great tradition of his father, Yale Hirsch, with this nonpareil almanac of Wall Street data. It’s a treasure for investors who want to remember the past as they plan the future."
--LOUIS RUKEYSER, host and commentator of the world’s favorite money program, Louis Rukeyser’s Wall Street
"Information is key to successful investing and investors will find the Almanac chock-a-block source of need-to-know stuff. "
--STEVE FORBES, President, CEO, and Editor in Chief, Forbes
"I have every issue since 1976 in my bookcase. The Stock Trader’s Almanac is an invaluable resource. ”
--MARTY ZWEIG, author, Martin Zweig’s Winning on Wall Street
"The Stock Trader’s Almanac should be on every investor’s desk. It’s an invaluable source of investment advice, trading patterns, and Wall Street lore. It’s also fun to read. I refer to it frequently throughout the year. "
--MYRON KANDEL, CNN Financial Editor

Support Suite101 and Use This Link to Buy

Suite101.com gets a commission for offering this book here. Please order these books using these links to help support Suite101.com. Stock Trader's Almanac 2005

Kirk's Investment Newsletter

As of 12/15/04, the Total Return for Kirk's Newsletter since 12/31/98 is 158%. Here are some more periods and comparative benchmarks:

 
              Kirk   S&P500  NASDAQ 
12/31/2002    +68%    +41%    +62%
12/31/2000    +34%     -3%    -12%
12/31/1998   +158%      6%     -1%

Click for a free issue of my newsletter
Suitable for the aggressive growth part of your diversified investment portfolio.

More of Kirk’s Recommended Books

I STRONGLY recommend everyone read these two books first before you spend ANY money on newsletters, financial plans, mutual funds, etc.

The Lazy Person's Guide to Investing by Paul Farrell
“A simple and easy to understand book that offers many well diversified, indexed portfolios and data to show how well they work.”
----- Kirk Lindstrom, editor Investing - Personal Finance at Suite101.com
The Four Pillars of Investing : Lessons for Building a Winning Portfolio by William J. Bernstein
“A Triumph! It is my candidate for the best investment book of 2002.”
---- John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group.

-- posted by Kirk

Top 129. Sep 25, 2004 9:54 PM

» passenger - "The Next Great Bubble Boom: ..." by Harry S. Dent

Anybody has read the book by Harry S. Dent:
"The Next Great Bubble Boom: How To Profit From the Greatest Boom In History 2005 - 2009"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/det...

Just wondering if his analysis and predication worths reading.

Thanks.

(

-- posted by passenger

Top 130. Sep 26, 2004 7:43 AM

» Normxxx - Profiting from Market Relationships

Intermarket Analysis: Profiting from Global Market Relationships

by John Murphy | 26 September 2004
Click Here
<img Align="Left" src="http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0471023299.01._PE32_PI_SCMZZZZZZZ_.jpg">

Excerpts From Customer Reviews:

Murphy begins with a review of the markets from the 1980s, recapitulating themes from the first book, including the close linkages among the currency, bond, commodities, and stock markets. His discussion of the role of oil and gold in economic slumps and booms is first rate, as he traces the interplay among these markets during the first Persian Gulf War and then during the "stealth bear market" of 1994. Throughout these presentations, Murphy captures qualitative relationships between markets that provide inspiration for traders interested in quantitative modeling. For example, the relationship between oil stocks and crude oil prices and the CRB/Bond Ratio are promising tools in capturing shifts in commodity prices that tend to impact the stock indices. I was particularly intrigued by his presentation of sector relationships during economic/market cycles, including the relative performance of cyclical and consumer stocks.

Where Murphy's book really shines, however, is in its explanation of intermarket relationships in a deflationary environment. He captures these relationships in his account of the recent bear market, drawing upon such diverse intermarket relationships as semiconductor stocks, Japanese markets, the Australian dollar, and the yield curve. This alone is a major advance over his previous text. At the end of the book, he traces the start of the recent bull market, illustrating the transition from a deflationary environment to an inflationary one--a pattern that also occurred after the great bear market of the 1930s.

Weaknesses in this book, from this reviewer's perspective, include an overemphasis on charts and visual data at the expense of quantitative treatments and a glib treatment of the Kondratieff Wave (long-term economic cycles). That having been said, this is an excellent market book. The presentation of sector rotation during economic cycles alone provided enough ideas to keep me busy with modeling efforts. Chart-based technical analysts and quants alike can find value in Murphy's work.
**************

Those who liked his first book will absolutely love this one. This reviewer considers it to be one of his top three current technical analysis/market references.

Murphy is perhaps the only man alive today that could have written Intermarket Analysis with such conviction. As he mentions early in the book, anyone with the benefit of hindsight can choose what indicators would have worked best. There is no skill in that. What gives him the credibility to analyze what was happening at the time is that he was doing it daily for his subscribers to the MurphyMorris Market Message Newsletter online and much of the book is documented with excerpts and detailed charts written at the time the events were unfolding.

-- posted by Normxxx

Top 131. Oct 17, 2004 8:31 AM

» Normxxx - POWER FAILURE

Flakes vs. Cowboys
How Enron Fabricated a Fake Energy Crisis in California

Excerpt from the book POWER FAILURE: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron by Mimi Swartz (with Sherron Watkins)

In the sea of peril that was about to engulf Enron, the co-opting of Arthur Andersen was a very small ripple. That was especially true when compared to the energy crisis in California, which was deepening simultaneously.

In the mid-nineties, California was the first state to deregulate electricity. It happened as companies were leaving the state in droves, creating a devastating recession. Along with the exorbitant state taxes, businesses complained about the high costs of energy. Deregulation was supposed to break the back of the old-fashioned, entrenched greedy utilities and, by 1998, give rate payers a 10 percent reduction in their bills. There didn't seem to be any downside.

But the solution turned out to be worse than the problem. California deregulated the wholesale side of its energy market, while keeping price caps on the retail side. Simultaneously, the state barred its utilities from Signing long-term fixed-price (i.e., cheaper) deals for power, forcing them into an increasingly volatile spot market. The stage was set for disaster. Soon the utilities were paying a fortune to power producers but couldn't pass their costs on to their customers.

Enron joined the deregulation fight early and poured millions into on-the-side-of-angels public relations campaigns, styling themselves as the good guys against the antediluvian utility owners. Skilling promised the state's regulators in June of 1994: "Under deregulation, California would save about $8.9 billion per year. . . . If you had S8.9 billion . . . you could triple the number of police officers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland and San Diego . . . you could double the state of California's construction for hospitals . . . you could double the number of teachers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland and San Diego . . . and you'd have enough pin money left over to cover the CPUC's budget." Enron promised to deliver power more efficiently, and to build better plants that ran on cleaner, cheaper fuels.

[Normxxx Here: Is this a great con job, or what? ]

There were just a few signs that Enron might not have been playing straight with the market. One occurred in May 1999—a difficult year in Enron's earnings department—the so-called Silver Peak Incident.

Timothy Belden was another Enron star. When he graduated from college in 1990, he joined the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, a research institution supported by the Department of Energy. He was a wonk who wrote policy reports on topics like "Theory and Practice of Decoupling." From Berkeley he moved to Portland General, where he continued to ponder the state of the electricity market: "It is doubtful that state PUCs will have time and expertise to reconstruct and dissect hedging decisions made by distribution utilities," he noted presciently in one report. He also stated that PUCs should act to "guard against speculation on the part of distribution utilities, even though it can be difficult to establish simple rules that can prevent speculative transactions."

But then, in 1999, Belden went to work on Enron's trading desk, where he came to run the western electricity-trading operations. Whatever contemplative life he may have envisioned for himself fell away under the pressures and rewards of his new employer. Before long, the committed environmentalist became a company man, swaggering across the trading floor, making millions for himself and the company.

Hence the events of May 24, 1999: Belden tried to send an enormous amount of power over some aged transmission lines—2,900 megawatts of power over a 15-megawatt path. Such a plan was destined to cause congestion on the line. California had an automated response to overloaded lines. Immediate electronic requests went to all the state's suppliers—Do you have Power coming across this line? Can you remove it? We will pay you to take it away!

[Normxxx Here: That's a class 1 felony if done with intent to defraud (as it apparently was in this case). ]

But on this day, there also happened to be a human watching the wires for California's Independent System Operator, who couldn't imagine why someone would send so much power over such a small line. "That's what you wanted to do?" the dubious operator from the ISO asked when she called to check to be sure that the transaction had not been requested in error.

When Belden replied in the affirmative—"Yeah. That's what we did."—she became even more incredulous. "Can I ask why?"

"Um," Belden replied, "there's a—there—we just, um—we did it because we wanted to do it. And I don't—I don't mean to be coy."

The operator suggested it was a pretty "interesting schedule." Belden agreed. "It—it's how we—it makes the eyes pop, doesn't it?"

The operator conceded that it did, and for that reason she would have to report the transaction to the power grid regulators because it was, in her words, "kind of pointless."

"Right," Mr. Belden answered.

From Enron's perspective, the trade wasn't pointless. Belden's move caused congestion that, in turn, drove the price of electricity up 70 percent that afternoon. The compliance unit of the state's power exchange investigated the trade and a year later fined Belden $25,000, but that was a small price to pay—Enron cleared S10 million that day, while California's electricity customers overpaid by around $55 million.

California's human-free automated system was completely dependent on the honesty of the power suppliers. But they weren't honest. Abusers like Belden found novel ways to game the system, converting it into a slot machine perpetually set on "jackpot." Belden was only too happy to pay meaningless fines when and if he was apprehended by plodding state regulators. And he was not alone. By June of 2000, the people of California, who had expected lower rates and better service from deregulation, found they had neither. Wholesale electricity rates in the state jumped 300 percent, an amount that made Texas energy trading companies who supplied the power—Reliant, El Paso, Dynegy, as well as Enron—delirious.

Whatever Enron and its competitors promised about deregulation—lower prices, freedom of choice, et cetera—they found out that they needed volatility, not stability, to make money. In a stable market, no one worried about their power supply, because the lights always came on and the air conditioner always worked. But if the supply was questionable, customers got anxious, and if the supply dwindled, they became willing to pay any price to keep their homes and businesses running smoothly. As Belden would write in an e-mail to Houston in the spring of 2000, as power prices soared, "We long. Prices keep going up. So far so good."

By the fall of 2000, California's major electricity generators had a big problem: They were facing power shortages but realized that they could not afford to buy power from the companies selling it on the spot market, as deregulation required them to do. The utilities began pushing for rate increases they could pass on to their customers. When the legislature refused, the power companies had no choice but to institute cutbacks.

Consumers were furious when denied power. The state then petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to install price caps on the suppliers so it could afford to buy what little power was available. When the FERC did so, out-of-state suppliers immediately vacated the scene.

By December 2000, the situation was perilous: That month, the state experienced its first Stage Three "rolling blackout"—meaning that the state was close to exhausting its electricity reserves. Literally, California's lights were going out, and with it the health and well being of the state's economy. The California official charged with keeping power flowing throughout the state panicked and then asked the FERC to lift price caps so that power sellers would return to the state. They did—charging even higher prices than before.

Meanwhile, in Houston, an Enron attorney named Stephen Hall started to worry. He was asked in October to research the company's electricity-trading practices because of an investigation conducted by the California Public Utility Commission. The more he researched, the more concerned he became. With a team of attorneys, he wrote an eight-page memo that detailed the tactics Enron's traders were using to take advantage of the state's energy crisis. With names like "Fat Boy," "Death Star" and "Get Shorty," Hall revealed how Enron created false congestion on power lines, transferred energy in and out of state to avoid price caps, and charged for services the company never actually provided.

[Normxxx Here: That last one is at least civil fraud. The others are clearly felonies, if intent can be shown. And there is voluminous evidence of intent, including the voices of the traders recorded on tape boasting of what they were doing! ]

Hall later met personally with various Enron executives, including Mark Haedicke, the general counsel for Enron's Wholesale Trading Group, and Richard Sanders, a vice president and assistant general counsel, and warned them that the practices could violate ISO tariffs and, more important, criminal laws. Sanders would later claim that after he got the memo in December he demanded that the practices be stopped. (He would brief Skilling on the subject in June 2001.) Internally, executives argued about repaying the California ISO for money made on improper trades, but decided against it. "If we send money back," traders told Sanders, "they'll know what we're doing." Whatever did or did not happen next, the subject became the hottest of hot potatoes. Haedicke's name subsequently disappeared from the distribution lists of Hall's anxious memos.

The situation in California did not improve, however, with the end of California state price caps and Enron's promises to behave. In fact, things got worse.

By mid-January 2001, California Edison defaulted on $596 million worth of payments to power companies and bondholders, and the rolling blackouts spread to northern California—that is, Silicon Valley and its environs. Governor Gray Davis drafted emergency legislation allowing the state to buy power, a situation that only made things better for the Texas companies—now they could negotiate long-term contracts at inflated rates with hapless state employees. Residential rate hikes were imposed in January and March, increasing rates by 40 percent. In April, Pacific Gas and Electric filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. It was at this time that Texas Senator Phil Gramm chose to weigh in, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times: "As [Californians] suffer the consequences of their own feckless policies, political leaders in California blame the power companies, deregulation and everyone but themselves, and the inevitable call is now being heard for a federal bailout. I intend to do everything in my power to require those who valued environmental extremism and interstate protectionism more than common sense and market freedom to solve their electricity crisis without short circuiting taxpayers in other states."

That statement sounded good if you lived in Texas: Those flakey, self-absorbed Californians plunged themselves into the energy shortage because they wouldn't despoil their paradise with enough plants to power their laptops, air conditioners, and juice bars. California, they charged, built no new plants in a decade, so what did they expect?

Enron rolled out a cadre of academics to back them up, people like economist Paul Joskow, the director of MIT's Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, whose funding came from Enron and Reliant, among others. In a New York Times Op-Ed piece, Joskow chided California for failing to build enough power plants for its population: "The lesson to be learned from California's [electricity crisis] . . . is not, as some have suggested, that deregulation is a bad idea."

The new U.S. president turned his back on California too. In early 2001, Bush adamantly refused to reinstate price caps in a state that, coincidentally or not, had supported his opponent.

Investigators from various governmental bodies began working on the crisis in the late winter and early spring, and made some interesting discoveries: They found that Californians, already ranked as the second-most-efficient energy consumers in the nation, actually used less energy in July of 2000 than the same month of the previous year. Then, too, California's energy usage during the current energy crisis never approached the all-time peak that had occurred in July 1999. Even more interesting, the actual demand for electricity never exceeded the generation capacity of the state's plants. Demand in January 2001—the month Senator Gramm chastised the state—was nearly 10 percent lower than in previous years, when there had been no blackouts. Power usage on blackout days was also lower than in previous years.

And contrary to popular opinion outside California, 170 new generation and cogeneration facilities had been built in the state in the 1990s, plenty to meet the energy needs of the populace.

It began to dawn on some California public officials that maybe some plants being shut down for maintenance—as their owners claimed—didn't really need it. Maybe drought conditions—also blamed by power generators for the crisis—weren't to blame either.

Maybe there was another explanation entirely for California's problems.

The contents of this letter/report does not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

-- posted by Normxxx

<img src=http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0393057828.01._PE30_PI_SCMZZZZZZZ_.jpg align=left>A Random Walk Down Wall Street, Completely Revised and Updated Edition

Top 132. Nov 9, 2004 5:43 AM

» Kirk - Revised: A Random Walk Down Wall Street

.
Burton Malkiel teaches economics at Princeton University.

by Burton Malkiel;
Revised and Updated edition (April 2003)

Synopsis An unconventional guide to investing in Wall Street tells how to put together a broad portfolio of stocks through sidestepping the experts and how to rate the potential of a stock, bond, money market fund, or other investment.

Review: The first edition of Bernard Malkiel's “A Random Walk Down Wall Street” appeared in 1973, a few years after the twentieth century's first big computer technology bubble, the go-go era, popped. This, the newest and eighth edition, appears after the popping of the dot.com bubble, the last of the twentieth century's great computer technology bubbles. Investors burned in the first bubble could have been excused; after all, they didn't have Malkiel's book. But it's astounding how avidly Internet speculators threw aside all that Malkiel and others had taught them. This book belongs on every investor's bookshelf, and ought to be consulted, or at least touched to the forehead, before any investment decision. Most investment books aren't trustworthy, because their authors are salespeople who are really making a pitch instead of trying to inform you. Malkiel is disinterested. He is a teacher with the intellectual discipline of a true financial economist, and yet he writes as vividly as a good journalist. We recommend this classic: all you need to know about the market is between its covers.

<img align=left src=http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0393058549.01._PE30_PI_SCMZZZZZZZ_.jpg>The Random Walk Guide to Investing: Ten Rules for Financial Success
by Burton G. Malkiel

Publisher: W.W. Norton & Company; 1st edition (September 2003)
Hardcover: 160 pages

Review: I've read a number of good personal finance and investment books but I have to say that I like this one most of all. The author is well respected and an authority in the field. The book is a quick read but it's filled with useful information written in a very readable style. I wish every book was like this.

Malkiel gives the reader some very fundamental advice on investments (index funds), asset allocation and planning your finances based on your risk aversion and age. It's simple and very straightforward. There are no gimmicks or get quick-rich schemes. And that's what I really liked about the book. This book gave me the confidence to manage my own investments and knowledge to do it intelligently. I would highly recommend this book to anyone especially people who are new to investing or people who are confused about all the options out there. Simply a great book!

-- posted by Kirk

<img src=http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0743222997.01._PE34_SCMZZZZZZZ_.jpg align=left>The Next Great Bubble Boom: How to Profit from the Greatest Boom in History, 2005-2009 by Harry S. Dent

Top 133. Dec 3, 2004 6:20 AM

» Kirk - Dent: The Next Great Bubble Boom

.
MarketVVizard posted an interview with Harry Dent in his forum Harry Dent LIVES!!! that talks about the predictions in this book.

55 used & new from $15.48

Edition: Hardcover

Review

David Bach New York Times bestselling author of The Automatic Millionaire Nobody called the nineties boom and bubble like Harry Dent, and now he is calling for another unexpected bull market. All investors should take notice.

Product Description:

For over fifteen years, New York Times bestselling author Harry S. Dent, Jr., has been uncannily accurate in predicting the financial future. In his three previous works, Dent predicted the financial recession of the early nineties, the economic expansion of the mid-nineties, and the financial free-for-all of 1998-2000.

The Next Great Bubble Boom -- part crystal ball, part financial planner -- offers a comprehensive forecast for the next two decades, showing new models for predicting the future behavior of the economy, inflation, large- and small-cap stocks, bonds, key sectors, and so on. In taking a look at past booms and busts, Dent compares our current state to that of the crash of 1920-21, and the years ahead of us to the Roaring Twenties. Dent gives advice on everything from investment strategies to real estate cycles, and shows not only how bright our future will be but how best to profit from it.

Dent gives us all something to look forward to, including:

* The Dow hitting 40,000 by the end of the decade

* The Nasdaq advancing at least ten times from its October 2001 lows to around 13,500, and potentially as high as 20,000 by 2009

* Another strong advance in stocks in 2005, with a significant correction into around September/October 2006

* The Great Boom resurging into its final and strongest stage in 2007, and even more fully in 2008, lasting until late 2009 to early 2010

Dent's amazing ability to track and forecast our financial future is renowned, and here he takes that ability to the next level, showing not only what our economy will look like but also how it will affect us as individuals, as organizations, and as a culture. From the upcoming wealth revolution to the essential principles of entrepreneurial success, the book describes a new society where economic and philanthropic development go hand in hand.

In The Next Great Bubble Boom, Dent shows not only how the economic growth of the late 1990s was a prelude to the true great boom right around the corner but how all of us can reap its benefits.

Holiday Reminder: If you value what you get from Suite101.com AND you shop online, then please use our Coop Store to enter your favorite online stores (or the direct link in the book reviews here) so we get a commission for sending you there.
Happy Holidays!

-- posted by Kirk

Top 134. Dec 3, 2004 9:37 AM

» Normxxx - Re: Dent: The Next Great Bubble Boom

In response to Dent: The Next Great Bubble Boom posted by Kirk:

From a review by Jonathan J. Grant

In the 90's Harry Dent shrewdly touted his "skills" at having called the market by extrapolating from the spending/saving/investing patterns of the consumption-driven baby boom bulge. Prescient genius? More like an educated guess-- probability-based and confirmation-biased coin flips being what they are.

Even so, his much hyped demographic-based system did work for a while, then crashed-- along with the market-- when the decade turned. In the "Roaring 2000's"-- which came out near the top of the bubble-- he bullishly advised investors to jump into equities-- advice that if followed at that time, no doubt led to severe fiscal injury.

Apparently the last four years have just been a hiccup, because here Mr. Dent is again, back with his same old spiel, along with post hoc explanations about how he actually saw it all coming and that his demographically-driven boom may not have happened exactly as he predicted the last time around, but will untimately be correct nonetheless.

According to Mr. Dent, the demographic stars are properly realigned, and we can once again get ready for boom-times through the rest of the decade. As before, his data driven arguments seem compellingly rational, but, unfortunately, the markets are not.

Harry Dent can bring out all the demographic tea leaves he wants, but tea leaves are all they are; and all he really is, is a marketeer trying to sell books (he even lent his name to the AIM Dent Deographic Trends Fund, which has followed his investment strategy since 1999 and is down almost 35% since inception as a result: UNDER-performing the market).

Wishful thinking aside, there is no way to beat the market, and Mr. Dent doesn't know its future any better than you do. Diversify your portfolio, allocate your assets, and keep your debts low. That's all that works, or that has ever worked. Some people may guess right, but chances are, it won't be you. "Systems" may work in the short term, but to paraphrase John Maynard Keynes: "in the long run, they're all dead." Save your money and your time and skip "The Next Great Bubble Boom."

The contents of this letter/report does not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of this message is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. It is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

-- posted by Normxxx

Top 135. Dec 15, 2004 7:34 AM

» Kirk - Holiday Reminder

.
Just a quick reminder that investment books make great holiday gifts. You can get overnight shipping from Amazon.com for those who wait until the last minute.

If you need some ideas, the books here are a good staring place.

Suite101.com gets a commission if you order from our links so please do so. It won't add to your costs.

Here are three suggestions that also serve to get you to Amazon.com so we get a commission.

Stock Trader's Almanac 2005
Published every year since 1967, Stock Trader's Almanac is a practical investment tool with a wealth of information organized in a calendar format.
"I have every issue since 1976 in my bookcase. The Stock Trader’s Almanac is an invaluable resource. ”
--MARTY ZWEIG, author, Martin Zweig’s Winning on Wall Street
The Lazy Person's Guide to Investing by Paul Farrell
“A simple and easy to understand book that offers many well diversified, indexed portfolios and data to show how well they work.”
----- Kirk Lindstrom, editor Investing - Personal Finance at Suite101.com
The Four Pillars of Investing : Lessons for Building a Winning Portfolio by William J. Bernstein
“A Triumph! It is my candidate for the best investment book of 2002.”
---- John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group.

Thanks and happy holidays!

-- posted by Kirk