OKW versus OKH
On the eve of war in 1939, the OKH remained beyond Adolf Hitler's control. Even with the meek Brauchitsch as Commander in Chief, the traditional independence of the Army generals proved to be impossible to overcome and lengthy arguments over policy and strategy were inevitable to bring about Army compliance. The presumptuous Army generals infuriated Hitler and corporal Hitler's meddling in their business irritated the generals. This frustrating relationship probably caused the generals to toy with a coup and it led Hitler to search for ways to circumvent the OKH. He found a willing alternative in OKW.
OKW was nominally a superior headquarters to OKH but its staff lacked the capability to conduct military operations without support from the independent services. Since its inception in 1938 OKW found itself relegated to irrelevance due to the lack of cooperation from the service branches in realizing its conception of a unified armed forces headquarters. As each of the service chiefs had direct access to Hitler, OKW did not have the capability to assert authority without Hitler's immediate support. This, however proved to be a useful relationship in OKW's particular bureaucratic struggle with OKH.
OKW was the only military headquarters in the Third Reich that had a vested interest in obeying Hitler's orders and Hitler probably recognized in it a potentially useful rival to the independent-minded OKH. By 1940 Hitler used OKW to plan and execute a military operation, the invasion of Norway. This initial effort at circumventing the OKH proved successful enough to form the basis of similar ad hoc arrangements in Finland and North Africa in 1941. The OKW capability to provide an alternative command structure, comparable to OKH, grew with these experiences. The OKH, however, remained substantially more capable of conducting military operations.
Hitler increasingly asserted his claim, as Führer of the Third Reich, to expect obedience from the Army of the Third Reich as the war progressed. During the campaigns against Poland and France this had been relatively benign. However, the campaign against the Soviet Union produced a serious clash between Hitler and OKH. The conflicting visions of the conduct of Operation Barbarossa initially led to a crisis after the conclusion of the Battle of Smolensk: Hitler sought to divert forces from the Moscow axis for an envelopment of the southern flank; the senior generals favored an immediate continuation of the advance to Moscow. The ensuing arguments dragged on for about one month before the Army acquiesced. Ultimately, as the advance on Moscow faltered and a Soviet counteroffensive ensued in December 1941, an even more serious crisis developed. It was at this point that Brauchitsch suffered his heart attack and was forced to resign and Hitler took over as Commander in Chief of the German Army.
Latest Articles