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Page 2
Before the German command felt ready (almost four months later), 200 of the new Panther tanks, 90 Elefant tank destroyers and a mass of the new Henschel Hs129 ground attack aircraft were made available for the battle as well as a host of Tiger Is, late model PzKpfw IVs and venerable Stukas. In total, the Germans assembled a force of some 2700 tanks and assault guns and 1800 aircraft; about 900,000 men were earmarked for the battle. It was the greatest concentration of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.
While the Germans were busy trying to create the conditions for a decisive victory at Kursk, Soviet military planning quickly reached a consensus on their strategic objectives for the summer. They intended to strike westwards in the general directions of Orel to the north of the Kursk salient, Belgorod and Kharkov to the south. Soviet intelligence knew German intentions thanks to the Lucy spy ring and Zhukov and the Soviet General Staff believed that it would be wise to wait until after the German offensive was spent before launching their own. Although Stalin wanted to strike first, because he feared that the Red Army would not be able to stand up to a German summer offensive (as they had failed to do in summers of 1941 and 1942), the unanimous advice of the professional soldiers convinced him of the wisdom of waiting. The Soviet forces allotted to the battle at Kursk were organized into the Central Front under Rokossovsky (with STAVKA representative Zhukov) facing Model in the north and the Voronezh Front under Vatutin (with STAVKA representative Vasilevsky) facing Manstein's forces in the south. The Steppe Front commanded by Konev was in STAVKA reserve to the east of the salient to guard against the possibility of a German breakthrough. Soviet defensive preparations in the Kursk salient were unprecedented in scale. In addition to having a numerical superiority in all weapons categories and manpower available for their defensive battle, the Red Army laid over 400,000 mines and produced about 5,000 kilometers of trenches in the salient. Soviet defensive positions were up to 175 kilometers in depth. The German command was well aware of the awe inspiring Soviet defenses in the Kursk salient. Nonetheless, the northern attack was ordered to begin at 0330 as scheduled. Soviet spoiling fire began at 0220 and this was indicative of how the battle would play out. Everywhere, German forces encountered stiff resistance as they advanced. Nowhere did they achieve a breakthrough into the Soviet rear. On July 13th, after nine days of intensive fighting with inconclusive results, Hitler called off the attack. The Allied landings in Sicily on July 10th and the lack of a breakthrough both played a role in that decision. Soviet forces were already counterattacking on a broad front and made substantial territorial gains in the following months.
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