Trap at Stalingrad
The failures of the early Soviet assaults on the flanks of Stalingrad led to a reevaluation of the situation by the Stavka, the Soviet high command, beginning in mid-September. It concluded that the lack of success could be attributed to insufficient preparation. The troops were inexperienced, the logistic support was inadequate and the command structure ineffective. Stalin ordered Zhukov and Vasilevsky to produce a new plan for an effective counterattack.
They produced the proposals for Operation Uranus -- an ambitious offensive aimed at encircling the German forces in the Stalingrad area by simultaneous attacks on the relatively weakly defended flanking Rumanian 4th (to the northwest) and 3rd (to the southwest) Armies. This plan reflected prewar Soviet military thinking about offensive operations (the "deep battle" concept) which had been discredited by the Great Purges. But, in light of the enormous success of the German Blitzkrieg, these doctrines were now becoming acceptable again. This was a process that was facilitated by the lack of any formal repudiation of these ideas by the Red Army -- just the commanders that had promoted such ideas in the past.
Operation Uranus was originally scheduled to begin early in November but delays in building up the forces considered necessary for the success of this offensive led to a start date of November 19th. The preparations for it were utterly ignored by the German command. In part, this lack of a correct appreciation of Soviet intentions for a massive counteroffensive could be attributed to the excellent concealment practices of the Red Army. However, the total disregard of any reports suggesting a coming Soviet offensive and the complete lack of contingency planning, especially in light of the previous years experience before Moscow, pointed up a serious flaw in the German command system's ability to produce a reasonable analysis of enemy capabilities. Knowledge of the preparations was certainly not lacking. Even Richthofen, commander of the German 4th Air Fleet in the Stalingrad area at the time, commented on the build-up in his diary on November 11th.
Rumanian resistance to the initial onslaught was remarkably effective given the offsensive strength of the Soviet forces engaged compared to the defensive capabilities of Rumanian units (which lacked any means of countering Soviet tank attacks).They managed to hold on for a full day before collapsing under the weight of the Soviet assault. Army Group B headquarters initially failed to appreciate the threat and did not respond immediately.
Latest Articles