In either case, Smolensk is considered the decisive encounter for determining the strategic result of the campaign. The battle of Smolensk was completed on August 5th. According to Glantz, total Soviet casualties in this battle amounted to 344,926 of the 581,600 man strength of their forces engaged in this battle (for the period July 10th to September 10th). The Germans claimed 300,000 prisoners and the destruction of most of the remainder of the 700,000 man strong Soviet force opposing them (by August 5th). Both claims lead to the same conclusion. Army Group Center had severely mauled the Soviet forces in this battle and at the end of it there was no meaningful Soviet resistance left on the road to Moscow. It was early August 1941.
However, in accordance with the revised plan, Army Group Center switched over to the defensive and Panzer Group 2, along with 2nd Army which had been the southern flank of Army Group South, advanced southward beginning on August 23rd. By September 12th, forces of Panzer Group 2, attacking southward, and Panzer Group 1, attacking northeastward, linked up some 160 kilometers east of Kiev. In the process, they encircled a Soviet force of about 600,000 men, effectively collapsing Soviet resistance in the western Ukraine. This movement resulted in a massive German victory over Soviet troops on the southern part of the front but it tied up German forces required for an advance on Moscow until the end of September.
The German forces regrouped for an assault on Moscow in mid-September and operations began on September 31st. In the intervening eight weeks since Army Group Center had last taken the offensive the Soviets had built-up their forces on the Moscow axis and prepared yet another strong defensive position before Moscow. It failed to stop the German offensive. A new series of encirclements ensued and a further 600,000 Soviet troops along with a substantial amount of equipment were lost before the German offensive came to a temporary halt on October 30th. Weather and logistical difficulties were the foremost reasons for this break in the German offensive. But the battle experience also suggested that Soviet resistance was not broken before Moscow.
The Germans resumed their attack towards Moscow on November 15th. However, the supply situation was not substantially improved from that at the end of October and most of the units were severely understrength and unprepared for winter. Soviet troops at the front fared little better but Soviet units that had been held in Siberia up to this time -- against the possibility of a Japanese attack -- were being brought into the strategic reserve at Moscow in preparation for a counteroffensive. German attacks continued with lessening strength against increasing Soviet resistance until December 5th when the operation was officially halted because the prospect of further gains was doubtful. This date generally marks the conclusion of Operation Barbarossa and the German defeat at Moscow. The Soviet winter counteroffensive began on the following day, December 6th.
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