The Battle for Moscow - Part I

To this end the German army deployed two of the four panzer groups available on the central front aimed for Moscow. In all, more men, more tanks and more aircraft were deployed with Army Group Center and directed towards Moscow than with either of the other army groups. The military's intentions for the campaign, therefore, were reflected in the force distributions and the underlying, yet tacit, agreement of the commanders responsible for the operation.

The divergent views of Hitler and the army over the ultimate strategic direction of the campaign had little impact on the operation when it began on June 22, 1941. During the first weeks of the invasion the Germans broke through Soviet defensive lines with such relative ease that not much consideration was given to the conflicting objectives laid out in the original plan. Yet, even though the campaign against the Soviet Union seemed to be proceeding smoothly, factors which would bring the German dispute over strategic direction into the open were evident before the Battle of Smolensk began in the middle of July.

At that time Army Group North was advancing at a satisfactory pace and was closing in on Leningrad -- it did not appear to require additional panzer troops, called for in the original plan, to reach its objectives. Army Group Center had achieved an overwhelming victory against the Soviet forces opposing it and was well positioned to strike at Moscow in the immediate future. Army Group South, however, had encountered far heavier opposition than anticipated and it was not advancing as quickly as had been hoped. The unexpectedly heavy concentration of Soviet forces in the south accounted for the slowness of the advance on this end of the front.

Differences in the rates of advance were exacerbated by the fact that the army groups were advancing on divergent axes. By early July, this had become painfully apparent in the disposition of forces on the front line. Army Group Center's progress towards Smolensk had created a giant salient in the center of the front. The bulk of its forces were concentrated on the eastward edge and, consequently, it had two relatively exposed flanks which represented inviting targets for Soviet counterattacks. Given that Army Group North was advancing northeastward and Army Group South was advancing southeastward, there was little possibility of these forces providing any coverage for Army Group Center's flanks. Allowing an immediate advance on Moscow by

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