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The German Reaction to Blitzkrieg

© Ralph Zuljan

German forces rolled over France in six weeks and most of the western Soviet Union in less than three months. The perception that these achievements were calculated successes based on a reasoned understanding of the revolutionary combination of tactics and technology that Blitzkrieg warfare represented is, however, false and has caused a great deal of confusion in the interpretation of these historical events. A closer examination of how the German High Command responded to their successes shows that Blitzkrieg was a serendipitous achievement which the Germans understood as poorly as the Allies.

Blitzkrieg victories depended on aggressive advancement of mechanized units without regard to their flanks or the inevitable enemy force concentrations to their rear. This opportunistic form of warfare depended on the independent action of local commanders and represented an unprecedented loss of control for senior field commanders as well as for the High Command. Even the liberal German military system found its senior commanders frustrated by Blitzkrieg warfare. German commanders traditionally had substantial freedom of action but Blitzkrieg pushed the demands for freedom from command interference to new levels, which inevitably strained relations with senior commanders who watched with ever increasing unease as panzer commanders advanced beyond the limits of supporting forces.

All of the German victories in 1940-41 depended on the risky yet effective Blitzkrieg method. The practical consequence of this process was a loose encirclement of front-line enemy units that gradually became tighter as regular infantry caught up and filled in the flanks of the advancing panzers. Generally, the psychological impact on the enemy of such deep penetrations behind the supposed front lines was great enough to overcome the threat of obvious counter-thrusts and this effect usually lasted long enough for the Germans to move up the relatively slow regular infantry units and trap the bulk of the enemy in isolated pockets.

It was inevitable that some of the encircled forces would be able to break through the initially thin encirclements until German infantry were able to reinforce it. During this period there were usually moments in which the leading elements of a German attack were themselves in danger of being destroyed - by the very forces they had trapped. Also, any enemy forces outside the pockets represented threats to the flanks of the advancing panzers. For such reasons, the panzer and motorized units leading an attack into the enemy rear had tenuous contact with their own rear at times. There were even occasions when the marauding panzer forces ended up completely cut off and in danger of destruction by forces they had nominally encircled.

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