Barbarossa - Part 9
Within two weeks of the surrender at Stalingrad, the Russian counter offensive had swept westward and reclaimed all the Caucasus, Kursk and Kharkhov and forced the Germans back to a line based on the Dnieper, where they had been before starting their campaign of summer 1942. If there had not been a sudden thaw, the Russians would have advanced further but the momentum was lost. By the end of February 1943, however, the Germans had recovered enough to counter-attack, and once again Kharkhov changed hands as a line was formed on the Doenetz. Hitler had, perhaps, learnt a lesson on tactical retreat for he now allowed the army to fall back to Smolensk in the north in front of Moscow, to straighten the whole line from the north down to the Black Sea.
There was, however, a Russian salient protruding west from this line. It was called the Kursk salient and was not a small intrusion; fatefully, without any real necessity for it, Hitler made its reduction his priority. It was so big, in fact, that any Russian offensive based on it would itself almost certainly have failed for want of sufficient men to cover the gap. Stretching from Orel to Belgorod, about 150 miles, and bulging about 100 miles into German held territory, it proved too much of a temptation, though little real danger, to Hitler. Finding the means was another matter. By now Hitler had been fighting all-out war for three and a half years. Casualties in western Europe had been comparatively light but, with the need for occupying forces in so many countries, with the needs of the campaign in North Africa, and with the ever-increasing casualties in Russia, both men and materiel were becoming difficult to find. Collecting the resources took time and it was not until the beginning of July that Hitler was ready. A huge force of 20 infantry and 17 armoured divisions, with 3000 tanks, stood poised along the whole salient for what Hitler assumed would be a walk-over. However, there were no reserves.
He had, also, like so many generals in history, much abler than he, relied on his own preparations and strength, without a great deal of thought of what the Russians might have been doing while they waited for the Germans. Russian intelligence, at least, knew that the Germans were going to come forward and it was soon apparent on what front. German intelligence, however, never very good in the war in Russia, seems not to have learnt anything of the state of the enemy or the ground over which the German armies were now supposed to advance. By force of circumstances, the Russian generals and government had had to learn all about warfare, very fast, and the means necessary to win. With the enormous manpower available, the army now ready to receive the German assault was approximately twice their size, of properly trained and equipped men. The generals had ordered the laying of deep minefields and the building of anti-tank defenses throughout the salient and had, in addition, withdrawn many of their troops to lines well back. All of these preparations showed how much the Russians had learned, especially in ensuring that their losses from capture were reduced from the enormous numbers of the early days of the invasion.
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