There were other North African 'sideshows', as against the main event in Russia, which continued to show Hitler's almost complete indifference to truly global considerations. Rommel's defeat after El Alamein was only assured by the lack of reserves and tanks, not to hand only because Hitler insisted on priority for Russia.. Rommel was a good commander let down by his leader, whereas Churchill had learned his lesson, finally, and had appointed Montgomery to head the Eighth Army and Alexander as C-in-C Middle East, while agreeing to reinforcements being sent in. Montgomery. Having removed the immediate threat from Rommel, the Allies began to appreciate more and more the possibilities of striking at Europe via Sicily and Italy. However, the key to success there was Malta. It was only 220 miles to the best port in North Africa, Tripoli, and 60 miles from Sicily.
The Germans, if not Hitler, had long recognized that this small group of 5 islands was essential to the Allies as it gave them ship repair facilities, a submarine base, and acted as an aircraft carrier. However, being so close to mainland Europe, it was a prime target for bombing and all its food, fuel and armaments had to be brought to it, through a Mediterranean nearly wholly controlled by Germany . There was a time, in March 1942, when Raeder had persuaded Hitler that an airborne invasion would easily take the islands. A plan had been drawn up for an assault in July but was cancelled by Hitler, and further postponed a few weeks later. Hitler could not spare any resources from Russia, and suggested that Malta could be kept quiet by bombing. Up to an extent it could, (in one two-week period there were 115 raids) but the Maltese would not submit. On many occasions, when supplies were running low, and convoys were being sunk almost in toto, it seemed that the Allies must abandon the islands. Eventually, in mid-June 1942, a large convoy got through that saved the situation. This, coupled with Spitfires flown in from an American aircraft carrier, made a radical difference. They quickly cleared the skies of Luftwaffe planes, giving the Allies a chance of unopposed attacks on Rommel's supply convoys. As already noted, Rommel reached El Alamein needing everything to sustain the push to Cairo but finding his supplies reduced by three-quarters.
The battle of El Alamein had been started on 23rd October and within 15 days Rommel had retreated 700 miles. At the same time a huge gathering of ships had been taking place near Gibraltar for an Allied invasion of North Africa. Operation Torch had been agreed in July 1942 and was a direct result of America's entry into the war, after Pearl Harbour in December 1941. The movement of this convoy, and the putting to sea of the British naval contingent at Gibraltar were known to Hitler and the German High Command as soon as they occurred, from German observers in neutral Spain. Oddly enough there was no consensus on their destination. Hitler thought it was just another convoy to Malta; in mid October he had dismissed the suggestion that some Vichy French troops should be sent over from France to strengthen those in Morocco and Algeria against possible Allied landings in Rommel's rear. However, by 7th November, he had to consider the whole matter again and this time assessed the possibility of a North African landing. Apart from warning Runstedt to be ready to occupy the remainder of France, it appears that nothing else was done on that date presumably because Hitler was just about to set-off for Munich and the annual Beer Hall Putsch gathering! In fact, nothing that he could have done would have helped because the Allied landings took place on 8th November in Morocco and Algeria
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