As had happened previously in the counter-offensive against the German front around Moscow, the germans were, therefore, again completely surprised at the size and direction of the counter offensive that the Russians now set in motion to defeat them at Stalingrad. Although a counter-offensive was half-expected, and the new Chief of General Staff, General Zeitzler, had information of the massing of armies to the south of the city, no one had foreseen the possibility of an encirclement which had become something of a German speciality but this is exactly what happened. From so close as 50 miles to the north and south of the salient leading to Stalingrad, overwhelming forces attacked simultaneously at dawn on 19th November and, by 23rd, had linked up about 60 miles west of the city - and the estimated 250,000 troops in Stalingrad were isolated. Both Paulus and Zeitzler had seen what was about to happen from the beginning of the offensive and had immediately asked for permission to retreat to the Don. Hitler would not allow a withdrawal from the Volga and issued the order to stand fast. This was clearly the work of a monomaniac, someone completely convinced of his own rectitude, and the needless sacrifice of a working army. The trapped troops fought on but it was a hopeless task without proper supplies; Paulus' estimated he needed 750 tons per day of ammunition, food, medical supplies, in fact every necessity including fuel. Winter had set in and gradually his men became weaker, and their perimeter smaller.
Hitler, having condemned the troops on 20th November, called on Field Marshall von Manstein on 25th to form a special army group, with the objective of relieving that very same 6th Army, trapped in Stalingrad by his orders. This time scale demonstrates only too clearly Hitler's incompetence as a commander; a good one knows when to retreat in the first place but this rescue order came with strings attached: Paulus was forbidden to try to break out as Manstein was breaking in. Manstein apparently told Hitler quite clearly that he had insufficient strength to break through and that with Paulus tying down Russian troops in actively trying to break out, there was every chance of success. Hitler was not interested and again ordered Manstein to break through while Paulus sat passive. By now it was 12th December and winter had arrived in full strength but, under General Hoth, starting 75 miles away from the city, the 4th Panzer Army had advanced to within 30 miles of the centre by 21st but still Hitler would not allow Paulus to attempt a break out, something which the German generals were certain would have succeeded. Again Hitler refused to listen and by now Hoth's own position was precarious. He was at the tip of a 45 mile long salient in Russian territory and getting hit from the flanks as well as stronger and stronger resistance from the front; he had, in fact, reached a point where he was unable to advance any further. But the Russians had already settled the matter.
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