Mediterranean Sideshows - Part 1

Having made his decision about Barbarossa and before finally having set the date, Hitler still had a war on his hands, truism though that may be. The irritating British, in addition to defying him at home were even entering his sphere of influence elsewhere with equally irritating results. Then there were the Italians, his so-called allies causing problems by independent, and usually disastrous, actions; there was Hungary yapping for its share of the scraps on offer; and then there was Spain of whose war aims Hitler knew very little, but who could not be allowed to stand as a potential threat in the west. Hitler would be able to see the British coming, if they were to try to enter mainland Europe, but Spain was part of it already and could be trouble. Appended to it was the strategic British base of Gibraltar, with its shipyards and refueling depot.

Franco had, in June 1940, promised to join Hitler in exchange for the French North African colonies and supplies of fuel, arms and food. Hitler went to meet him as the first in a round trip by train which would include meetings with Petain and Mussolini. But, now, Franco said he wanted the colonies without any quid pro quo, and he was not prepared to help in taking Gibraltar in any way, even to allowing German troops passage through Spain. It seems that all dictators have the same instinct of self-preservation and use allies only so long as needed. If it were not so grotesque, it would be laughable to imagine Stalin, Franco and Hitler as three children arguing about whose ball it is and only agreeing to play when they needed something. All that Hitler got from Franco was a cloud of words which eventually resolved into a de facto neutrality; Hitler had again met his match in betrayal. Petain, the leader of Vichy France, the part allowed 'independence' by Germany, did not seem to need consulting but his name still held considerable sway in the French colonies and Hitler hoped to get active participation by French troops. Petain, however, was only prepared to say that France would support Germany in its war against Britain and Hitler thought it better to leave the colonies alone; by allowing, say, Italy to invade any of them might well turn them against Germany when it was better they remained neutral.

Having gained little from these two meetings, Hitler was not in the best of moods when he got off the train in Florence on 28th October, to find Mussolini strutting up to announce that his army had invaded Greece that morning, despite the fact that warnings had been given him since August to stay out of both Greece and Yugoslavia. No doubt Mussolini had been encouraged by the fact that his troops in North Africa had crossed the Libyan border in September and had advanced about 60 miles to Siddi Barrani in Egypt with little opposition from the British, whose protectorate it was. Hitler was enraged. He had to wait until the spring of 1941 before he could invade Russia, at least another 6 months, and he had to bluff Stalin that any movements in the Balkans were only to consolidate Germany's position and not to threaten Russia. Undoubtedly, he would invade Yugoslavia and Greece when the time was right to ensure his rear was completely secure, but only when he chose. And while he had been distracted by all the competing claims for his attention, the British had quietly taken Crete and Lemnos, strategic islands from which they could easily bomb the Romanian oilfields.

Go To Page: 1 2

Articles in this Topic    Discussions in this Topic