|
|
|
Page 2
Preparing the ground, Hitler had in May 1935, in one of his major speeches which spoke of peace but always contained almost hidden threats of war, noted that a mutual-assistance pact had been made between Russia and France in March but which remained unratified by the French parliament. He said that this pact had introduced 'an element of legal insecurity' into the Locarno Pact. As before, with his hidden 'we will join any disarmament pact provided the level of armaments is the same for all' speech, this went unchallenged. The legal uncertainty was something invented by the Nazis to create a reason for action when they so decided and the world had not learned yet to look for these duplicities. There was no more mention publicly of the insecurity and, while waiting for the French ratification of the pact, Hitler was very busy with the highly secret preparations for the reoccupation of the Rhineland, a demilitarized zone set up as part of the Treaty of Versailles, while France and Britain were looking in the wrong direction, trying to stop Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.
Such was the state of Hitler's readiness to risk all, as soon as the pact was ratified on 27th February 1935, the German high command were issued final orders on 2nd March and the German 'army' entered the zone on 7th March. By all accounts, it was not an army - at Nuremberg it was stated to be one division, the Allies thought it was three, and Hitler said that he only had four brigades - but in spite of the fact that this was the most serious violation of the Treaty so far, an open defiance of it, not one of the Allies, and in particular not the French, made any sort of attempt to march in themselves in defence of the Versailles Treaty. As noted, this violation was deliberately planned and carried through by Hitler in the certain knowledge that he would be allowed to keep what he took. And it was the gateway through which he now pushed at ever increasing speed in fulfilling what he saw as his destiny. At this point the Allies could have stopped him, destroyed his so-called army, and ensured Hitler's downfall, all with no danger of full-scale war. What should have been routine intelligence gathering was either not carried on by the Allies, or they were completely incompetent at it. They overestimated the German army strength by 200% and, probably, were completely incorrect in their knowledge of the arms available, the ability of German factories to provide more, and the army reserves available. We have all paid the most terrible price for this complete lack of preparation.
The copyright of the article A History of Appeasement Part 2 - Page 2 in The Third Reich is owned by . Permission to republish A History of Appeasement Part 2 - Page 2 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|