Once you go nuclear, sanctions or no sanctions, there is no coming back. Whether President Clinton likes it or not, there used to be five nuclear powers, but now there are seven. Whether the world deplores it or not, India and Pakistan have also joined the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) league of nations. It doesn't really make much of a difference to the some 18 dozen states that are still non-nuclear. The world is now only marginally less safe than it used to be before May 11.
From a reformist's perspective, the explosions may indeed act as a potent catalyst to altering the direction of the nation, restructuring the fundamentals of society and drastically reforming the mode of governance. If history is any guide, genuine reforms have only taken root in societies that either faced an extraordinary external threat or a grave internal economic crisis.
Take the traditional 19th century Japan, for instance. The Tokugawa Dynasty, which had ruled Japan for more than 200 hundred years, failed to stand up to extreme Western trade pressures. Traditionalist Japan along with the Tokugawa family had to give way to Meiji restoration which in return ended the class system, introduced a land tax, brought in merit based (as oppose to patronage-based) bureaucratic recruitment and established a totally new system for local as well as national governance. Additionally, education was made compulsory, Japanese students were sent to overseas universities and the Bank of Japan was created to lay the foundations of a stable system of fiscal management.
The Ottoman Empire had also resisted reforms until the Austrians snatched away Hungary, Venice took away important Aegean islands in addition to losses inflicted by the Poles and the Russians. The reform movement that began in the 18th century - including the adoption of modern European weapons, complete military reorganisation, education and the mode of governance - was indeed a response to heavy battlefield losses.
In the more recent past, reforms have generally been a direct result of internal economic crises rather than because of losses from an actual war. In the early '60s, for instance, hyperinflation and a stubborn recession precipitated economy-wide reforms in Indonesia. Unfortunately, about one million were killed before Suharto's New Order was ushered in. In 1990, Peru also went through a similar reform pattern (World Development Report, 1997).
At this critical juncture, Pakistan also faces a looming internal financial crisis. Undoubtedly, ideal soil for reforms to take root. Having said this, what is certain is that the road that lies ahead isn't going to be an easy one. We have lived on handouts all our life and, barring a miracle, a technical sovereign default is inevitable.
