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Russia and the Caspian: The New Middle East. Part VII

© Jeffrey Deutsch

This looks to be the last issue on the Caspian Sea region. I think I've covered the area adequately to give the educated layperson a headstart to understanding events, including why I think one should bother to understand events there. If you think I should explore one or more Caspian issues in greater detail, let me know ASAP.

Top story: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan are out of the CIS' defense structure. They declared at the April 2 summit that they would not renew their participation in the Collective Security Treaty. Also, both Azerbaijan and Georgia declined to sign a statement protesting NATO's bombing in Yugoslavia. In fact, all sides in Azerbaijan's domestic political arena are said to approve of it. And, Azerbaijan is confirmed to attend NATO's 50th anniversary ceremonies later this month. Meanwhile, Georgia has asked for the exit of Russian peacekeepers from Georgian soil.

Caucasian conflicts tend to be pipeline politics: Georgian, Azeri and Ukrainian forces are holding maneuvers as you read this, on Georgian soil under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace program (the same one under which Azerbaijan is sending a platoon to join a Turkish battalion for Balkan duty). The agenda is simulating various problems with the previously-discussed Baku-Supsa pipeline.

The US and Turkey are plumping for an extension of that pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. In particular, the Turks greatly prefer an overland route through Turkey to increased oil tanker passage through their straits. The Turks worry about the possibility of a major spill in the straits.

The pipeline, in fact, is expected to be the middle segment of a Caspian-wide single pipeline to supplant (read: replace) the one now going through Russia. The idea is to be able to export Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas without going through Iran or Russia. The proposed route is from Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan, under the Caspian and through Baku.

As for Kazakhstan, the Kashagan field has undergone tests of its actual oil content, and those tests are expected to yield results this summer. In any case, the Tengiz oilfield is being developed and would be serviced by the proposed pipeline.

Currently, Kazakhstan uses the Russian pipeline and Iranian ports to export her oil. And Russia's Blue Stream project - an extension of her current pipeline to run under the Black Sea from Russian territory to Turkey - is the main competitor to the trans-Caspian pipeline.

Equally interestingly, she has agreed with China to ship oil and natural gas to China through a pipeline the Chinese would help build. And she and Turkmenistan (who ships some of her gas to and through Iran) have agreed to to export more of their oil and gas to China and Japan. (The just-mentioned pipeline could possibly be linked with Turkmen fields as well.)

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