Russia and the Caspian: The New Middle East. Part V in a series

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Mar 19, 1999

Things have been moving quite quickly in the Caspian this March.

To begin with, Boris Berezovsky is no longer CIS Executive Secretary. President Boris Yeltsin fired him - without even consulting the other CIS members beforehand. Especially in light of the announcements he'd made after meeting with Georgian and Armenian governments, this certainly isn't going to impress members like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with Moscow's considerate attitude towards its neighbours. More on this story as it develops: by the time you read this, there will be four weeks left to shore up the CIS defense structure before the Treaty expires.

In the meantime, the involvement of nearby powers, which I have discussed at length in previous pieces, has been officially acknowledged and is now one or two big steps closer to reality. Vartan Oskanian, the Armenian Foreign Minister, said in an address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs that a regional - that is, Caucasian - forum should be established. He proposed that it comprise Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, the Central Asian nations (presumably Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan)...and Iran and Turkey. Indeed, he specifically expressed regret that Iran had previously been isolated from others in the region (which has been due in some part to US policy). This would be the legitimation of outside - albeit neighbouring - involvement in the Caspian region.

So far, no official response has been made (publicly). However, on the same day, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reiterated Iran's offer to mediate the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. The timing may suggest a favourable response to Oskanian's proposal.

Apparently, though, according to Oskanian, some outside involvements are more equal than others. He responded to concerns regarding Russian armaments in Armenia in conjunction with the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict by saying that the Russo-Armenian treaty specifically bars their being used in the conflict.

(Presumably, if the situation escalates into a shooting war and Azerbaijan - perhaps with the help of a US/NATO airbase - launches strikes against Armenia, Russian anti-aircraft missiles will be spiked and Russian pilots will sit quietly while their planes are bombed on the ground.)

On the other hand, he voiced grave concerns regarding the possibility of Turkish troops in Azerbaijan, saying that it would upset the balance necessary for the Nagorno-Karabagh cease-fire. Um-hmmmm....

Not that Turkey may feel she has much choice if subsequent events play out like they may. The previously-discussed Baku-Supsa pipeline is expected to be extended to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Indeed, Turkey has previously played host to oil pipelines: she hosted the Iraqi pipeline to Ceyhan. Turkey would then have a sizable financial stake in the pipeline, and hence in Azerbaijan's and Georgia's fortunes by extension.

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