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In my previous article, Meltdown in Moscow - SPECIAL REPORT, I said:
For now. (emphasis added) Well, guess what? The Taman (Kremlin Guards) and Kantemirovskaya Divisions and the Tyepli Stan Brigade, based near Moscow, as well as Interior Ministry forces, have been ordered to gear up (as in cancel officers' vacations, thoroughly run through preparations, examine gear, etc.) to take action in extraordinary circumstances. This has been hotly denied, of course, but it has been independently corroborated. As far as I know, none of Yeltsin's civilian opponents has comparable influence over the military. The closest candidate would be ex-general and nationalist Alexander Lebed, but he's trying to change things relatively peacefully, and through established procedures, like running for office. But Yeltsin doesn't only have to worry about his civilian opponents. Back in March - before Chernomyrdin and his government were thrown out of office - I wrote an article Feature: The Military in Russian Politics: Then and Now which included: It is not a matter of material deprivation. Marshals will not even think of overthrowing their legitimate governments, particularly elected governments in countries with no traditions of military rule, over lower numbers in budgets or less food in their rations. Soldiers are, after all, trained to take pride in what they can go through . . . for their country. But if they believe their country couldn't care less what happens to them and that their sacrifices are meaningless, and especially if they believe the meaningless sacrifices will continue and worsen as a result of ineffectual government measures, they might reconsider transferring their loyalty to other leaders who can give them perhaps the two things most people, all powerful people and especially all soldiers most need: respect and reliability. Well, for one thing, the spectacle of soldiers, unpaid for months on end, begging in the streets and being fed dog food does not impress me with the idea that the Russian authorities care what happens to, or respect, their soldiers. Certainly their sacrifices (and their officers' as well) have not only continued but also worsened (as have most Russians'). "Ineffectual and unreliable" seems to be the epitaph of a government that subsequently lurched through not one but two complete governmental turnovers, and has proven unable to stop the fall of the ruble or pay its debts.
The copyright of the article What Is To Be Done Now? in Russian Politics is owned by . Permission to republish What Is To Be Done Now? in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
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