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A casual glance at the news from East Asia lately would suggest that the Republic of Korea is in big trouble. However, this assumption is being made too hastily. The failures of several major banks and chaebol (industrial conglomerates) have necessitated intervention from the increasingly beleaguered International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has stepped in with a record-breaking $57-billion aid package. Recently, appeals for such massive aid have come from nations like Indonesia, only partially developed and reputed for its system of political repression and corporate patronage, or Thailand, which has a habit of chucking its old Constitution every few years or so and reforming the government from the ground up.
But South Korea is different from these two nations in that the roots of democracy are taking hold. The presidential election to be held December 18 is downright normal, as three candidates are running elections in fairly American style: a healthy mix of mudslinging, finger-pointing, scandal-mongering, flag-waving, and finally, rising above it all, a serious discussion of the pressing issues of the day. The major issue in the election is, of course, the economy. The IMF bailout is going to be painful in many ways, but most Koreans realize that it is an inoculation against a far worse (and far more contagious) disease. The IMF payments, though heavily front-loaded to relieve Seoul of its billions of dollars in short-term debt, are laden with conditions and demands. Korea must slash government spending, narrow the current account deficit, reform the credit and accounting practices of the chaebol, and ease trade barriers to open its markets. The initial $5.6 billion payment came December 5; the second payment of $3.6 billion will be available December 18, contingent to Seoul's cooperation with these (and other) IMF benchmarks. That gives Seoul two weeks to make a great deal of headway, which may be difficult with a lame duck in office and the political landscape occupied by an election campaign in its final sprint. One condition in the IMF agreement was particularly telling. The IMF asked Seoul to "drastically lower economic growth," from the currently forecast 6.0 percent to 2.5 percent. The Korean Finance Ministry, which has agreed to the other IMF stipulations, responded by stating that Korea next year would lower growth to 3.0 percent. It is as yet undecided whether that cut in growth will be sufficient for the IMF, or whether the 0.5 percent is worth a squabble.
The copyright of the article Korea in Transition in East Asian Politics is owned by . Permission to republish Korea in Transition in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
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