Lessons From Kosovo

"The world fears a new experience more than it fears anything. Because a new experience displaces so many old experiences ... The world doesn't fear a new idea. It can pigeonhole a new idea. But it can't pigeonhole a real new experience."   -   D. H. Lawrence.

WHENEVER EVENTS TURN OUT DIFFERENTLY from expectations, there is an opportunity to draw new lessons. It was the conventional wisdom, to which I subscribed, born out by history that conflicts could not be won through the use of air power alone. Air power could, like it did in the Gulf War, decimate a military infrastructure so thoroughly that ground troops meet meek resistance. Nonetheless, in the end, ground troops would be necessary to compel capitulation.

It is possible to quibble about the effectiveness of air power in Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army engaged Serbian troops on the ground drawing them out to positions where they were more vulnerable to NATO air power. A thin argument could be made that in Kosovo air power was not really acting alone. Near the end of the war, NATO was amassing troops on the border at least offering the prospect of a ground invasion, an option that had been ruled out earlier. This may have persuaded Serbia of the wisdom of withdrawal from Kosovo. It must still be allowed that the surrender of the Serbians was unexpected   -   unexpected by all except for most optimistic proponents of air power.

There have been moments in history when technology significantly alters military strategy. The Moguls, mounted on horses, dominated large fractions of Europe and Asia. Gunpowder rendered personal armor less useful. The mechanization of war beginning with the American Civil war and maturing during the First World War wreaked human destruction on a massive scale. Atomic weapons terrorized and at the same time made less likely conflict between major powers. Could it be that the advent of dominant air power and precision ordinance has made a standoff antiseptic war possible and even desirable?

Perhaps Kosovo was unique in that it was located in Europe making the application of air power more logistically possible. Perhaps the Serbians were not so intransigent given that ethnic Albanians called Kosovo home. Kosovo may have been more like conquered territory than homeland to Serbians. Perhaps Serbia was moderately developed and therefore felt the effects of bombardment more acutely than a country like Iraq or Afghanistan.

The Kosovo War may mark a change in military tactics or it may be the exception that proves the rule that war requires more than air power. What would happen against a different adversary capable of downing pilots? Would NATO have been willing to negotiate a settlement if pilots were dying? How long can an expensive air war be maintained if civilian casualties mount?

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