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This article will be done in a question and answer format as I am sure many readers are probably asking these same questions but not adventurous enough to post them.
Why should the UN sanctions be continued or be lifted against Iraq? This is perhaps the most troubling question facing the United Nations today. Many human rights organizations would argue that the sanctions are violating the basic human rights of the Iraqi people and are doing nothing to bring down the regime of Saddam Hussein. They would continue to argue that lifting the sanctions would enable the Iraqi people to gain access to basic medical supplies and other basic essentials. Those opposed to lifting sanctions would argue that the sanctions were brought on the Iraqi people by Saddam Hussein who has constantly denied the Iraqi people their basic rights since he came to power. This is part of a systematic plan on the part of the Iraqi leader to squelch opposition and the sanctions are designed to prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors with weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has shown on numerous occassions his willingness and capacity to use those weapons on his own citizens (systematic attacks on Kurds and Shi'ites as well as prisoners). If you have other questions you'd like to see answered here or addressed, you can either email me (in which case I will post them) or you can begin or add to one of the discussions ongoing in this area. The new layout here has made it even easier to post your comments here and access the information of the databases much more efficiently. Go To Page: 1
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