There were valid reasons to stop offensive operations against Iraqi forces. Even in hindsight, the decision was probably correct in light of the geopolitical situation at the time.
As American-led coalition forces were dealing a severe defeat to the Iraqi armed forces, political analysts at both the Central Intelligence Agency and at the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency were concerned that as the coalition ground offensive pushed further into Iraq and threatened the strategic city of Al-Basrah, Iraq might collapse into three distinct enclaves-the Kurds in the north, the Sunni Muslims in the central region around Baghdad, and the Shi'a Muslims in the south. It had always been American policy that the territorial integrity of Iraq be maintained, primarily to counterbalance Iranian power in the region. The collapse of Iraq into three enclaves might be too tempting for the Iranians to ignore - after all they were still smarting from a military defeat at the hands of the Iraqis just three years earlier.
At the same time, there had already been a subtle shift in the attitudes about the war on the part of Arab and Muslim coalition military officers as well as the local Saudi population. In great measure this change had been brought about by the media's depiction of the gruesome nature of war as it was crystallized on the so-called "highway of death." This now-famous stretch of highway led from the western edge of Kuwait City north through the Al-Jahra' pass and onto the four-lane desert highway to Iraq, the only major road out of the city to the north.
To defend the highway leading north to the Iraqi border, Iraqi combat engineers had sown extensive minefields on both sides of the road. Any attackers would be channeled to and through the narrow pass. These defenses were to create the conditions that led to the scene of destruction on the evening of February 25, 1991. A U.S. Air Force F-15E fighter-bomber disabled an Iraqi vehicle in the pass, causing a major traffic backup that stretched for several miles.
