Editorial: The USS Cole - A Victim of Bad Policy?

The October 12 terrorist attack on the USS Cole while refueling in the port of Aden raises serious questions about U.S. foreign policy decision-making, specifically political-military policy. Aside from the most important question – who did it? – it might be wise to ask the Pentagon why was the ship in Yemen at all?

On October 19, former Central Command (CENTCOM) commander in chief, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, testified before Congressional committees that he had made the decision a few years ago when he was at the helm to use the Yemeni port for refueling U.S. Navy ships. Zinni stated that he was presented only with poor choices of refueling locations. This statement flies in the face of conventional wisdom - there are numerous safer refueling locations in the region - Abu Dhabi, Jebel Ali, Dubai, Fujayrah, and Muscat come to mind. When you add the fact that this particular ship had a range in excess of 4000 miles, the claim of the requirement to refuel in Aden loses credibility. Although there is no doubt about the need to use more foreign ports due to cutbacks in military spending and the resultant loss of refueling ships to support underway replenishments, the USS Cole issue has more to do with politics than with logistics.

At the core is CENTCOM’s longtime desire to establish a headquarters in the region – a valid requirement. In a perfect world, CENTCOM headquarters would be located in the region in a stable country with adequate support facilities. That means Saudi Arabia or Egypt. These two countries have been traditionally friendly to the United States and have the infrastructure to support an American military presence. However, neither country will allow it for internal political reasons. Given strident animosity toward the United States for what most Arabs consider blind American support for Israel, no Arab country could permit the permanent stationing of U.S. forces on its soil and survive the resulting public outcry.

Conversely, the countries that might allow the presence of a U.S. military headquarters do not meet the requirements. Kuwait is too close to Iraq; Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman are too close to Iran; and Jordan is too close to, and tied to, the Syria-Lebanon-Israel situation (and these three countries are in the European Command area of responsibility).

CENTCOM has thus set its eyes on Yemen, despite Yemen’s vocal and material support for Iraq during the Gulf War. The Republic of Yemen occupies the southern strip of the Arabian Peninsula and controls the eastern side of the southern entrance to the Red Sea. CENTCOM has always considered the location to be of extreme strategic importance – perhaps overly so.

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