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North Korea, Nukes, and Nonsense

© Carey Goodman

Does anyone truly believe North Korea will back away from its nuclear weapons development program just because of diplomatic pressure? No - unless they are on the UN pay roll and do not want a job as a weapons inspector. What conflict has diplomatic pressure ever tangibly solved? Regretably few, and definitely none as bold as trying to force a sovereign state to abandon a nuclear weapons project that consumes the greater part of its national budget.

Arms negotiations during the Cold War were one thing. Those talks essentially were based on the notion: "I have nukes, and you have nukes, so let's agree on a number of nuclear warheads that will allow us each to blow up the world ten times...Oh, you think fifteen times is better?...Well, since one war triggered by either of us should finish things off quite fine, let's compromise at thirteen times...". The US and the Soviet Union each recognized the other had nuclear weapons and they provided that technology to their allies. That situation is called deterence by mutually assured destruction, and in those circumstances it worked well.

Since then the "nuclear club" has entered a time of disorder. No clear accounting exists of who has nuclear weapons, who wants them, who is close to getting them, and who couldn't care less about them. For a long time it has been tacit knowledge that Israel has a nuclear weapons program, but Israeli leaders have never held a press conference to say: "Okay all you Arab states and West Bank Palestinian kids. You make your threats and throw your rocks. We don't care because we have a few nuclear warheads". For a long time the condition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear programs were mere speculation. The speculation was confirmed only when these countries actually conducted tests.

The more serious concern is for smaller countries and rogue states who may not want a full set of missile-launched long range nuclear warheads. These nuclear club probably-are-members would be content to have a supply of small "suitcase nukes" which can be quite effective in a very concentrated area. These states also may find a "dirty bomb" is quite sufficient for their needs. Developing these instrumentalities of war requires (1) a quick Internet search; or (2) inviting some out-of-work scientists to the country in question for a long weekend. If the pay is good, the scientists will keep quiet, and because the technology does not require mobilizing big reactors, the program can remain essentially undetected until its weapons are used.