The Chechen civil war is more intricate than the Tajek embroglio. The conflict runs the gambit from armed attacks to political propaganda to rumored coups in the Chechen government. A solution still remains elusive, but many agreements have been concluded and breached as to whether Chechnya will be allowed to exist as a sovereign entity.
Chechnya. The mere word evokes images of wars as brutal and as frequent as anything Afghanistan has experienced. Like the wars in Afghanistan, the Chechen wars are dominated by religious, ethnic, and other motivations that presage the other wars in trans-Caucasia.
On 14 November 1991 Chechen leaders informed Soviet and Russian leaders that Chechnya wanted independence from Russia. Russia refused to recognize the sovereign republic; within thirty-six hours Russian tanks and soldiers filled the streets of the major Chechen cities, and the small and insignificant region quickly gained prominent status. During the next eighteen months Chechens and Russians engaged in some armed confrontations. On 11 May 1993 Russian fighters fired two heavy artillery rounds into the Chechen Parliament building in Grozny and killed seven people including three pro-secession legislators. This event moved the battle from the military to the political front. Ruslan Khasbulatov (a key rival to Mr. Yeltsin) advised the Congress of People's Deputies they should grant Chechnya complete independence and warned that the 11 May incident proved Mr. Yeltsin was ready to suppress severely any sources of opposition he disliked. On 3 October 1993 Mr. Khasbulatov (an ethnic Chechen) also fled a burning Parliament chamber, and his rhetorical lambast seemed somewhat prophetic.
Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Khasbulatov gradually compromised on the Chechen problem. On 3 August 1994 Mr. Khasbulatov fully supported announcements from Russian television that implied pro-Russian opposition groups had ousted the government of the breakaway republic. No Presidential elections would be held; a Council of State would be selected to ensure the security of the republic until order was entirely restored. The Chechen government wasted no time to respond to the announcement and claimed they were still in control of the situation. They condemned the rumors of a coup as "propagandistic prattle". Mr. Khasbulatov also wasted no time to convey his belief that if the opposition did not already control Chechnya, it would soon win de facto authority. He suggested that the Council of State was very capable to renew good relations with Russia. Mr. Khasbulatov also abandoned his anti-violence rhetoric to lead a pro-Russian paramilitary group, but he did not deny the speculation that he might seek election as Russian or Chechen President. Clearly the troubles were far from ended.
