Russia's Search for Liberty: Part VI. Conclusions
Russian political parties have no real platforms; they only have leaders. These parties do not contest elections according to policies negotiated at annual conferences; the word of the party leader is the party stance. When disputes emerge, no real mechanism exists to smoothe out differences for the greater good. Internal governmental or factional rifts cause gaping cracks in the facade of the new Russia. Many of today's party leaders are the same people who previously extolled the virtues of communism. These leaders have no concept of how to create a free society if they cannot decide they should accept differences of opinion between the government and the Duma.
Russia has endless difficulties with holding elections. Since 1990 many elections were delayed; few elections were held when they were scheduled; some elections were never held; some elections were declared non-binding. The 12 December 1993 election was held two years before the Constitution then in effect required it. After the 25 April 1993 referendum, Mr. Yeltsin promised to hold Presidential elections in June 1994, but after his victory to adopt the new Constitution, Mr. Yeltsin decided he should keep his job until June 1996 when the 1977 Constitution then in effect stipulated the term expired. Some Yeltsin advisers proposed delaying the 1995 Duma elections until 1998. The elections were held in 1995; Kremlin colleagues suggested Mr. Yeltsin should cancel the 1996 Presidential election; Mr. Yeltsin ignored that advice.
In the provinces all this voting without substantive result led to a sense of apathy towards elections, politics, and government. Voter turnout at the 1990 Congress of People's Deputies election was 88%; it was 81% at the 1991 Presidential election, 64% at the 1993 referendum, and 53% at the 1993 Duma elections. In March 1994 voter turnout was so low at district and local elections in St. Petersburg that the Mayor extended the voting an additional day. That decision was deemed unconstitutional and revealed the embarrassing truth that Russia's "second capital" could not form a city council by democratic means. The declining turnout persists. At the 1999 Duma elections Mr. Putin's bloc barely received a plurality at an estimated 46% voter turnout.
Learning to interpret these data present other issues. Some Russian analysts calculate the lack of a vote as a vote against the government. Others regard the nonexistent vote as a vote that supports the government. Others classify the nonexistent vote as simply nonexistent and therefore not relevant
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