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Something Not So Nice in Nice

© Carey Goodman

It is a familiar scene that occurs twice each year. The heads of state and government of European Union (EU) member countries gather to present the world the next stage of the ongoing process to create "a more perfect Union". The more complex that Union becomes, the less united it seems.

During the first decade of existence of the European Communities, these semi-annual meetings were essentially occasions for European leaders to reiterate lofty goals of co-operation. Then in 1966 France (one of the six founding members) briefly withdrew its participation to protest the use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Qualified majority voting is analogous to requiring a two thirds majority instead of a simple majority to approve a measure. An elaborate agreement known as the Luxembourg Compromise prohibited the widespread use of qualified majority voting in the Council, and France was briefly placated.

With fifteen actual members and twelve applicant members, the situation of voting in the Council of Ministers is now much more complicated. During the last thirty-five years qualified majority voting has gradually regained acceptance. Its role was enhanced by the 1986 Single European Act, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and now the 2000 Nice Treaty. The reason is simple: With more members, France, Britain, and Germany (the three largest and most influential members) risk losing a good bit of their authority. Qualified majority voting will de facto require coalitions of large and small states to approve Council actions. The prospects of such coalitions does nothing to assuage the resentment large states express towards the loss in 2005 of one of the two European Commission appointees the five largest states now have. In 2005 each member state will have one Commissioner. In pursuance of the new Nice Treaty, when membership expands beyond twenty-seven states, Commission seats will be apportioned in a rotation sequence. The European Commission is analogous to the EU executive; the Council is rather like the upper house of a bicameral legislature. The European Parliament (which in recent years has gained significant authority to approve or reject certain Commission appointments, budgets, and decisions) is rather like the lower house of the legislature.

As the European Communities evolved into the European Union, a battle emerged among the members in respect of payments of subsidies and annual budget contributions. Typically those states that contributed the least to the European Treasury received more benefits of Community membership via subsidies. Those states that paid more to Brussels perceived their funds to be misdirected. During the 1980s Britain requested and received a rebate on its contributions, but when Spain and Portugal joined the Community in 1986 two new members in need of subsidies emerged. Spain and Portugal now lead the opposition to EU expansion because they fear the loss of these fiscal benefits. When a budget crisis seemed inevitable, the belief was strong among European leaders that if they held out long enough, the German Chancellor would always bail them out. This trend was usually true, but the illusion was not permanent.