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It was the poster child state for viable democracy in the Middle East. Could Lebanon reclaim that role soon?
That system collapsed in 1975 when Syria invaded Lebanon. As part of Syria's victory, a pro-Syria government was installed. Therein began the era that ruined Lebanon's economy and Beirut's reputation and prosperity as a commercial center. As a counter to Syria's invasion, Israel sent its forces into south Lebanon in 1982. That was the first of several Israeli entries and withdrawals. The US briefly tried to play a role as insurgent neutralizers in what in retrospect would be the first battle in the "war on terror". In that incident the US withdrew after Syrian operatives bombed a Marine barracks and killed 240 people. Then a series of hostage taking incidents placed previously pro-West Lebanon on the US State Department list of states that support terrorism. The change in fortune and status is attributable to Syria, but Syria is not the only instigator. By its support of Hezbullah and other radical Islamic organizations, Iran also played a part to change Lebanon. Iran directly and indirectly provided funds, fighters, and weapons to Islamic groups and Syrian-sponsored paramilitary factions. The recent assassination of one of Lebanon's former prime ministers may be the turning point in the Syria/Lebanon nexus. Days after the assassination, Lebanese students took to the streets in the first phase of peaceful protests. Then on 28 February the Syrian-backed Lebanese government resigned, pre-empting Parliamentary action to seek a vote of confidence to depose the government. Is this apparent attempt at reform and restoration of democracy real or is it a Syria-instigated ploy to illustrate that without its leadership and military presence, Lebanon would be ungovernable? As strange as the ploy theory may seem, this would not be the first time Syria tried such a tactic. Pressure from Western countries including the US would give Syria plenty of motivation to keep Lebanon within its self-created zone of influence. Combine the protests in Lebanon with Syria's assistance to capture Saddam Hussein's half-brother, and the result is no less than puzzling. If the words "Syria" and "charm offensive" seem as if they do not belong in the same sentence, that perception generally is accurate except in respect of one not-too-minor detail: Syria does not want to be on the wrong end of international sanctions. Suppose Syria does plan to diminish its role in Lebanon and does want to help capture terrorists. That would only strengthen the US policy towards the Middle East: First Libya, then Syria yielded without direct application of military force. By contrast if this is just a public relations ploy, it enables Syria to delay the backlash a while to discern the appropriate Baath Party line. Go To Page: 1 2 |
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