South Africa's Election: The ANC and Disunity

South Africa's election was held on 14 April, and the African National Congress (ANC) won by a substantial margin, so this topic might seem like very old non-news. But as tends to be true of most things in South African politics, the real story of the election was not the election itself, but the intense rivalry that almost sent the election results into a bitter court fight in one province.

That the ANC and the Incatha Freedom Party (IFP) do not collaborate well together is an understatement of the hostilities that dominate the two parties' relationship. The IFP perceives the ANC as hipocritical in its rhetoric about equality, and the ANC regards the IFP as a party whose the ANC would like to have - and to some extent needs - but the ANC knows it cannot rely on the stability of that support.

During the 1990s the IFP caused extensive riots in its base province of Quazulu-Natal. Those riots effectively - but indirectly - inspired riots in other provinces at the time the ANC desperately wanted to convey an outward image of peaceful inter-racial co-existence. The solution was to induce the IFP to support the ANC at the all-party elections in 1994 in exchange for a cabinet-level ministry. The deal held through the election, but the ANC was periodically reminded it could not keep the IFP entirely in check.

The IFP reacted rather calmly during the 1999 election cycle. The 1994 bargain held its effect. Taavo Mbechi was elected President with IFP support. Soon afterwards the IFP indicated it regretted that support, and the question of affairs was not whether the 1994 bargain finally would fall apart, but when the 1994 bargain would fall apart.

During the next five years the ANC/IFP relations went from generally difficult to generally unpleasant to basically bad to very bad then to total breach. As a matter of technicality the 1994 deal was still in effect at the 2004 election, but it existed in name only. The IFP enacted the classic policy of "don't help, but don't hinder" in the campaigns in Quazulu-Natal. The hindering would begin after the votes were counted.

By April 2004 backing Mr. Mbechi seemed like a losing proposition. His handling of the HIV/AIDS issue caused him trouble with plenty of voters; the ongoing investigations into the activities of several ANC politicians including the Deputy President Jacob Zuma gave the government plenty to worry about beyond the bounds of pure statescraft. The mindset was: "Don't be surprised if Mbechi goes down this round". He led in the opinion polls, but his overall negatives were much higher than his positive ratings. That only helped the IFP "don't help but don't hinder" strategy. The IFP probably bargained on a diminished ANC win to allow the IFP to position itself more prominently with the new coalition.

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