The "New Europe" will be established in spring 2004 in pursuance of a new Treaty of Rome. If the Preamble to the proposed Constitution for the European Union is any guide, the new Treaty of Rome will be more of a compromise document full of legalistic ambiguities than its predecessor.
Yes, the European Union is in desperate need of documentary consolidation. The last forty-six years have produced an endless compilation of regulations, directives, decisions, opinions, treaties, and other sometimes binding and sometimes non-binding decrees. The problem is that a federalized Europe looks nice as a talking point on paper, but when the impact of applying that principle is presented, even the most staunch Europhiles find that at a very basic level, they, too, are Euroskeptics. Take as examples the revisions to the Common Agriculture Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy. France and Italy think nothing of supporting measures in the Council of Ministers that would reduce Spain's subsidies, but if the same measures could affect Italy's subsidies or France's subsidies, those countries will vigorously oppose the measures. Invocation of sovereignty and defense of subsidies from Brussels are the tacit price of collaboration.
In recognition of that reality, how can we presume the leaders of this vast new Europe will be able to derive a common foreign policy? They proved quite the reverse with their attitudes towards the conflict in Iraq. Given that such divergent opinions and divergent national interests resulting from historic and economic differences will not simply vanish because of something known as the "new Europe", a common foreign policy will produce statements from Brussels that are tepid at best and that eventually will render Europe diplomatically ineffectual.
As the European Union membership expands, and as more of those member states enter the euro-zone, the European Central Bank will find that it must tangibly address the issue of its member states' finances. The much-elaborated convergence criteria have already been "tweaked" by some euro-zone states. The extent of this "tweaking" is not fully known, but logic would suggest that it is probably more significant than the state central banks would have us believe. The prospect of Jean-Claude Trichet as the next Governor of the ECB also has its share of public relations problems. Although Mr. Trichet performed his duties at the French central bank quite adequately, and although he was officially exonerated in the Credit Lyonnaise scandal, the fact remains that Mr. Trichet signed those fraudulent reports, and reasonable minds may wonder whether he might do the same for other European banks - many of whom have substantial financial problems now.
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