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The A-12 Debacle

© Patrick Worden

Stealth technology has arguably been one of the most dramatic advances in military aviation since the end of the Second World War. Experiences in Viet Nam, particularly, convinced the Pentagon that some mitigation had to be found to counter the radar-guided anti-aircraft forces that were so effectively blunting America’s air campaigns.

Development and deployment of Stealth began in the ‘70s, gained steam during the ‘80s and came into its own in the 1990s. By the turn of the century, the United States Air Force still finds itself relying heavily on the battle-proven F-117 and the B-2 Spirit, while squadron-level service of the stealthy F-22 Raptor is just around the corner. The Army, meanwhile, is close to deploying the first Stealth chopper, the Comanche.

Stealth technology, then, is nearly 30-years old and has thoroughly proven its ability to save pilots’ lives. So why has the U.S. Navy Air Wing—one of the world’s largest air forces in its own right—yet to deploy Stealth aircraft?

The answer to that question is a case study in bureaucratic mismanagement and government waste. The Navy’s first—and thus far only—Stealth aircraft development project was canceled over a decade ago. By that time the A-12 project was billions of dollars over-budget, while nearly every contemporary Naval aircraft program—including desperately needed upgrades to the F-14 Tomcat and the A-6 Intruder—had been scrapped to free up procurement dollars. Billions more would be lost in the ensuing lawsuits between the government and the A-12 development team, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas.

Not a single A-12, not even a prototype, was ever built.

The A-12 Avenger II was to be the Navy’s 21st century strike craft, and was widely known as the “Flying Dorito” due to its unique Delta design. A two-seat, all-weather bomber, the A-12 was to carry 10,000 lbs of precision munitions (and probably nukes) in internal weapons bays. The Navy and Marine Corps would be outfitted with carrier-capable models, with a modified version to be later assigned to the Air Force. The A-12 would have been the first aircraft flying for all three services since the Viet Nam-era’s F-4 Phantom.

Problems with the aircraft’s development began almost immediately. Although the F-117 Nighthawk had already been deployed by the time the A-12 project began, the government’s arcane regulations for “black budget” projects forbade the sharing of technology between branches. What this meant in practice was that the Navy, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas had to “re-invent” the Stealth technology already perfected by the Air Force and Lockheed. Navy project managers were even denied access to data from the “Have Blue” tests, the earliest experiments in Stealth dating from the late 1970s.

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