The First Anglo-Burmese War had been ended by the Treaty of Yandabo, which left the British in possession of the territories of Tenasserim and Arakan, among others, as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states. However, the Burmese court refused to accept the calamitous loss of face they had suffered and responded with more arrogance to the invaders: in particular, they considered the need to negotiate on equal terms with a mere viceroy to be particularly insulting. King Bagyidaw succumbed to depression and eventually insanity. His courtiers found numerous excuses to fail to comply with the Treaty requirements.
On the British side, it seems clear that there had been no long-term plan to annex and colonise the whole of Burma. India had been recognised as a natural frontier for British ability to control trade in the east. It had been the need to protect the borders of British India that the British Expeditionary Force to invade Burma in the first place. But step by step, the British were led into expansionism beyond their plans, although they were subsequently happy to benefit from the advantages.
Over the next few years, a succession of protocol, border and political issues caused tension between the two countries. These tensions were exacerbated by the eventual breakdown of King Bagyidaw and the subsequent manoeuvring in court to fill the power vacuum, while a succession of British governor-generals fell ill in difficult conditions, which further hampered communications. War was not inevitable, of course, although it did prove to be possible and, as ever, disastrous for the poor and the vulnerable especially.
Based at Ava, the Burmese court had little means of control over many of its outlying nobles or powerful Dacoit warlords, some of whom were virulently anti-British and who seized opportunities to harass British interests when they could. The British responded when military units were available, in massive force where possible. One such occasion occurred in 1851, when the British in India believed that a Burmese demonstration of aggression would have to be ruthlessly stamped upon to prevent the idea of British weakness or fallibility spreading throughout the region. Ships were dispatched to Rangoon harbour and soldiers soon followed.
Under the command of the Marquess of Dalhousie of the Royal Navy, the subsequent military operation that followed the rejection of terms required by the British, was of consummate professionalism. Supplies were prepared beforehand for secure barracks and the measures to cater for the health of the men were such that the mortality rate was below the peacetime average for the British in India. Rangoon and Martaban were occupied, although it was still hoped that some kind of accommodation could be made with the Burmese, who were now ruled by Pagan Min. Unfortunately, Pagan Min turned out to be an unhelpful partner in this regard, with many outrages against his and other people leading to a distrustful atmosphere.
On the British side, it seems clear that there had been no long-term plan to annex and colonise the whole of Burma. India had been recognised as a natural frontier for British ability to control trade in the east. It had been the need to protect the borders of British India that the British Expeditionary Force to invade Burma in the first place. But step by step, the British were led into expansionism beyond their plans, although they were subsequently happy to benefit from the advantages.
Over the next few years, a succession of protocol, border and political issues caused tension between the two countries. These tensions were exacerbated by the eventual breakdown of King Bagyidaw and the subsequent manoeuvring in court to fill the power vacuum, while a succession of British governor-generals fell ill in difficult conditions, which further hampered communications. War was not inevitable, of course, although it did prove to be possible and, as ever, disastrous for the poor and the vulnerable especially.
Based at Ava, the Burmese court had little means of control over many of its outlying nobles or powerful Dacoit warlords, some of whom were virulently anti-British and who seized opportunities to harass British interests when they could. The British responded when military units were available, in massive force where possible. One such occasion occurred in 1851, when the British in India believed that a Burmese demonstration of aggression would have to be ruthlessly stamped upon to prevent the idea of British weakness or fallibility spreading throughout the region. Ships were dispatched to Rangoon harbour and soldiers soon followed.
Under the command of the Marquess of Dalhousie of the Royal Navy, the subsequent military operation that followed the rejection of terms required by the British, was of consummate professionalism. Supplies were prepared beforehand for secure barracks and the measures to cater for the health of the men were such that the mortality rate was below the peacetime average for the British in India. Rangoon and Martaban were occupied, although it was still hoped that some kind of accommodation could be made with the Burmese, who were now ruled by Pagan Min. Unfortunately, Pagan Min turned out to be an unhelpful partner in this regard, with many outrages against his and other people leading to a distrustful atmosphere.
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