Drunk-driving roadblocks have become commonplace since the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) in which the Court approved highway sobriety checkpoints. The checkpoints were highly successful at detecting drivers operating under the influence while at the same time providing only minimal intrusion into the privacy of most motorists. Those being the case, why not apply the checkpoints to other infractions, such as drug trafficking or invalid license checks? The U.S. Supreme Court will answer that very question during its next term.
In the Sitz case, the Michigan State Police Department established a highway sobriety checkpoint program, which included guidelines for site selection, checkpoint operations and publicity. During the only operation date 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint, the average delay per vehicle was 25 seconds and two drivers were arrested for driving under the influence. Licensed Michigan drivers filed suit seeking injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints. The State Court of Appeals agreed with the licensed drivers, found that the sobriety checkpoint programs are generally ineffective, subjective intrusion into the privacy of individuals was substantial and ruled the program violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Injunctive relief was granted.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and overturned the Michigan State Court of Appeals decision. The justices found a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. It then used a balancing test to determine "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." In its analysis of the public concern served by the seizure, the Court stressed the magnitude of the drunken driving problem and "the slaughter on our highways, and the dangers posed to almost everyone by the driver who is under the influence of alcohol..." The Court refused to pay more than lip service to the question of whether the seizure advances the public interest. The Court simply stated that it did not mean to transfer, from politically accountable officials to the courts, the decision of which methods should be employed with limited public resources.
Finally, the issue of interference with individual liberty failed to persuade the Court a Fourth Amendment violation resulted from the checkpoints. The Supreme Court found that the objective intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, was minimal. Subjective intrusion, or the fear and surprise a motorist would feel about the checkpoint also was deemed minimal. The Court noted the "fear and surprise" of the law-abiding motorist was the subjective intrusion to consider, not the "fear and surprise" of the motorist who had been drinking. Under that standard there was not significant intrusion into the realm of individual liberty. As such, the sobriety checkpoint withstood Fourth Amendment scrutiny and the practice could continue.
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