Flaming June - Part 1

Fending off Napoleon's telegraphs as though they were so many wasps at a a picnic, Pélissier continued imperturbably to plan the next phase of attacks with Lord Raglan. Both agreed that their priority target should be the Malakoff bastion - once it had been taken the allies would so dominate the whole of southern Sevastopol, that the Russians would be left no alternative but to evacuate.

To take the Malakoff was of course a lot easier said than done. Thanks to Totleben's effective strategy, the redoubt was very well protected by the Mamelon, or Kamtchatka Lunette, itself well covered by the 'White Works' twin redoubts on its left flank across the Carenage Ravine, mutually supporting and with a further battery position to the rear. It's probably worth a glance at the map at this stage, where we also see a similar situation confronting the British Right Attack - the Great Redan fortress, second only to the Malakoff, covered by the Quarries position. The name was misleading. The ground in front of the Redan sloped gently down for 400 yards where the angle got considerably steeper, forming a low ridge. There had been some quarrying done just above that point before the War, and the spot had been marked by haphazard piles of stones and rubbish; Totleben had cleared it all away and constructed a strong defensive work stretching across the centre of the Worontzoff Ridge.

Pélissier was as usual very clear in his own mind what he wanted. Two separate infantry assault operations, the first to clear the outworks, the second to take the Malakoff. Both to be preceded by heavy 'softening up' artillery barrages. He knew he had Raglan's approval, having given wholehearted support for simultaneous British actions against the Quarries and the Redan. However he knew that there would be reservations from other senior commanders. Bosquet for one was not happy at the open ground to be covered between the foremost French trenches and the White Works - 330 yds to the nearest, the Volhynie, and a further 300 to the Selinghinsk. It was 500 yds from the trenches to the Mamelon. Bosquet agreed that the Malakoff was the way to go, but wanted the trench system extended forward first. Others felt that the first assault should be made on the Flagstaff bastion. The artillery pounding it had taken made it a softer option and the trenches were much closer. Others wanted a diversionary attack and wrote him a note about it. So when he convened his War Council on 5th June he made clear that the only decisions to be made were on timings; what was to be done was not up for discussion. When asked whether the attacks on the outworks might be exploited forward onto the bastions if an opportunity presented, the answer was a firm 'no'.

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