On Sep 11th he received first reports of Allied naval activity off the coast - probably Raglan's personal reconnaissance force -but didn't react. A further problem was that the Allies, though they didn't know it, had total command of the seas. The Black Sea Fleet, 14 men-o-war and 7 frigates, were all sailing ships and suitable only for defence of Sevastopol from within the shelter of its harbour. However on 13th the smoke of a sizeable fleet was visible over the horizon from Sevastopol and reports came back from the eight battalions deployed in the Alma-Katcha area of around 100 vessels moving north east towards Evpatoria.
Menshikov was later criticised for not moving to oppose the landings, but the key lay in Allied sea power. The landing at Evpatoria could have been a feint, with troops quickly reembarked and sailing to seize an unguarded Sevastopol before the Russian Army could have got back. Alternatively, given the landings were for real, it is doubtful whether the forces they could muster in such a short time could even have delayed the landings, as the guns of the fleet would have controlled the beaches. Since his main objective was to defeat the enemy in the first clash of arms, he was anxious to meet them on ground of his own choosing. At this stage Menshikov still believed it was a raid in strength, and he reinforced the troops in the Alma area up to 20,000 to await developments.
These came quickly. On the 15th a patrol from 57th Don Cossack Regiment captured eleven foraging French soldiers. Under interrogation they revealed that the Allied invasion force was between 50,000 and 100,000 strong including cavalry. This was corroborated from the ship count relayed from Tartar civilians in the invasion area. Clearly this was more than a raiding party. It was also now clear that the Allies were after Sevastopol, and that they vastly outnumbered the available Russian troops.
Menshikov decided he had to delay the Allies until sufficient troops had arrived from the mainland to evict them from the Crimea. He would therefore attempt to bar their route by creating a defensive line on the most suitable ground north of Sevastopol. He urgently requested additional troops from Kerch and began a rapid build up. On 18th September he reported to the Tsar that his Army was being assembled on the Alma near the village of Burliuk on the main Evpatoria-Sevastopol road. The enemy had completed his disembarkation but had not yet moved.
