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The Russian Army in 1854 - Part 2

© John Barham

Infantry offensive strategy was based on the tactical doctrine that victory in battle would be achieved by large numbers concentrated in dense columns. Their aim was to close with the enemy and overwhelm them in hand-to-hand fighting with the bayonet. The provision of firepower was the responsibility of skirmishers and artillery support.

Battle formations were geared to this concept. The skirmish line was generally deeper than the allies equivalent: there were 48 designated skirmishers per infantry company of 230 men. Its formations and firing procedures followed a strict drill, although the top six marksmen had discretion to engage opportunity targets, such as (enemy!) officers. A close quarter reserve was positioned 30 to 150 paces behind the open order 'active' line, depending on the terrain.

The main body of infantry typically advanced in Company Column, closely followed by Battalion Column, which was the main attack formation. It consisted of two parallel columns twelve ranks deep on a company-wide frontage of around 60 men. It was considered absolutely essential to the success of the attack that the column operate as an immaculately symmetrical precision unit. Therefore any rush or charge across intervening ground was totally unacceptable. The 1848 Officers' Drill Manual emphasised that the success of the column depended on the correct extension of the pointed toes whilst marching, and on platoon commanders setting the correct pace and number of steps to maintain barrack square dressing.

In view of this thinking it is understandable that most training time was spent on the drill square, mastering the distinctive parade step. To learn this, trainees had to stand on one leg with the other leg stretched out with toes pointed until the drill sergeant was satisfied that the whole squad was aligned in perfect symmetry - it could be many long minutes before the step was changed and the whole process started again with the other leg. Soldiers losing their balance or collapsing through cramp were immediately thrashed back to their feet. If an officer was present the drilling NCO was liable for a physical as well as verbal lashing in front of the squad. The parade step was the overriding criterion by which a unit's efficiency was judged. While most other armies spent time on field training, the Russians paraded. But even cynical foreign military attachés had to admit that the Russians were a superb sight at review.

Back in the 18th Century, the famous and arguably best ever Russian general Aleksander Suvorov had coined the truism 'The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a hero' although the truism he actually coined was a good deal snappier:'Pulya Du ra, Stoik geroy'.(stress the italic bits to get the rhythm). This maxim was still applied well into the 1880s, and according to one ex-Red Army officer, was even current in World War 2, albeit used ironically when times were tough and ammunition was running out. Certainly in the 1850s it was accepted without question, and time spent by the rank and file infantry musketeer on small arms training was minimal.

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