The French Army in 1854If the British Army drew its inspiration from the Wellington era, it is equally true that the French continued to be influenced by the main principles of the military thinking of Napoleon Bonaparte. His Maxims were as revered by the Army as the Thoughts of Chairman Mao were to become by 20th century Chinese communists; rather like Mao's thoughts, many of the Maxims were thoroughly sensible and timeless in their application whereas others required rethinking in the light of technological progress or previously unencountered circumstances. As with the British, perceived wisdom from the Napoleonic Wars was only going to be overturned by experience. Although France had not been involved in a major European war since 1815, the Army had fought a protracted colonial war in Algeria between 1830 and 1847 against a formidable local force well led by the Emir Abd-el-Kadir. Initially the Algerian Gouma cavalry had been used to great effect against the French artillery and baggage trains. When General Bugeaud was appointed to command there in 1840 he realised that the Emir's tactics of fluid high speed manoeuvre could only be defeated by an equally mobile force, and he straightway cut the ball and chain from his army, reducing artillery and logistic support to their acceptable minimum. This allowed him to apply the Napoleonic doctrine of rapid aggressive movement to achieve surprise, and in time he won the campaign. The key factor was getting the balance right, and there were plenty of examples from Algeria of failures due to breakdown in logistic support. These had helped to highlight the need to pay heed to the interdependence of mobility and logistics. Partly for this reason, the French unlike the British had an effective staff structure in place, with a defined unified chain of command. It comprised officers from every arm, and from specialist services such as pay, postal, chaplain and military police, political and geographic intelligence and last but not least the 'Intendance'. The Intendance, or Administrative Service, carried responsibility for the supply of all medical and veterinary, transport, rations, clothing and accomodation services. There was a staff presence for each of these functions down to Divisional level. There were detailed standing order procedures for the establishment of formation administrative areas, including standard layouts. At lower levels, in addition to the normal allocation of administrative responsibilities, non-combatant females known as 'vivandières' (Lit. food ladies) were fully integrated into the military establishment on a scale of at least one per regiment. Their job was to provide meals and drink, to organise clothes washing, doing it themselves if necessary, to run the unit canteen and to act as auxiliary nurses tending the sick or wounded. (In the field hospitals, professional nursing was provided by Sisters of Mercy). Vivandières were subject to the same treatment, conditions and status as soldiers, and had their official place in the Order of Battle next to the musicians - many of them were married to bandsmen. They paraded with their regiments on all occasions, and wore female versions of the appropriate regimental uniform.
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