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The British Army in 1854 - Part 2

© John Barham

The sort of conditions which we looked at in Part 1 were not likely to attract many volunteers beyond the desperate, the disillusioned or the deceived (by recruiting sergeants), even in grim mid-Victorian Britain. One third of line infantry private soldiers in the Crimea were Irish, many originally victims of the famine disasters of the 1840s. All recruits had to sign on for 21 years; there was the option to leave after 10, but early discharge carried no pension. Promotion to Corporal and Sergeant demanded minimum literacy; the basic education system was better in Scotland than elsewhere in the UK, and a high proportion of NCOs were Scots. But for the overwhelming majority, this was the achievable summit. A huge social gulf separated officers from other ranks. A very few outstanding senior NCOs were promoted to junior officer rank, but inevitably they led a life of misery, not because they were intentionally ostracised or victimised, but because life had not equipped them with the background essential for peer acceptance in the Officers Mess.

Regimental officers were often absent from their commands for long periods in peacetime - there was no useful function that they could serve in barracks, other than Duty Officer chores. The men's expectations of their officers were simple and direct. They had to be obvious 'Gentlemen', to lead from the front, and show unflinching bravery and disregard for personal safety in battle. This they achieved to perfection. But no self respecting NCO wanted an officer hanging around during daily routine. And of course NCOs were far more capable at organising and supervising what passed for training.

Such training consisted of endless drilling to move into and in the standard battle formations. Infantry battalions varied in strength between 700-900, divided into 8 companies. The standard formation on the march, for manoeuvring and for advancing to contact was the column. For the assault, the battalion deployed into line, two deep on a 200 yard front. For the defence, against cavalry charges or lightly armed hordes, the battalion formed square, each face four deep, with the NCOs and Officers in the middle. It was a matter of honour that a square should never be broken.

There were typically three 2 hour drill periods per day to exercise these formations, six days a week.

Personal training consisted of bayonet drill and musket drill, which was quite complex with muzzle loading weapons. The one highly significant modern development had been the almost general upgrade from the 1842 percussion musket to the 1851 pattern Minié rifle which fired an elongated bullet reasonably accurately to beyond 400yds. Its vastly increased muzzle velocity could allow a single bullet to pass clean through several bodies in close order column. But there was scant opportunity for live firing, due to the lack of rifle ranges. Even the Guards prior to 1852 fired only 30 rounds every three years. After 1852 the situation improved when alarm grew at the emergence of France's Second Empire, and an all arms training area was established at Chobham in Surrey, capable of accommodating 8-10 thousand troops at a time. However the few attempts at major exercises were shambolic tactically and useless administratively - the men slept in camp, transport was hired by the day, and supplies delivered to the training area by contractors from London. Only the Royal Artillery gained real benefit from the opportunity for regular field firing practice at the Chobham facility.

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