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For most of the period from 1815 to 1854 the fate of the British Army was decided by the dictatorial judgements of one man - The Duke of Wellington. His reputation as a military genius had become so immense after Waterloo that it lasted until his death in 1852. Alas, his unchanging attitude can be summed up as "If it was good enough to beat Napoleon, why change it?" There had been no major European conflict involving Britain to prove Wellington right or wrong. There had been plenty of fighting in India and the Colonies, but 1815 methods complemented by the enduring bravery and resilience of the soldiery had usually proved sufficient to overcome local opposition. The few disasters had been explained away, with no lessons learnt.
A major problem was the lack of any unified command structure. There was no staff system as we know it, with specialists managing all the individual functions necessary to make formations effective fighting units. Most arms and services were used to doing their own thing. The Commander-in-Chief, although nominally the head of the Army, had no control over the Artillery or the Engineers - they came under the Master General of Ordnance, who also controlled fortifications and military property. Supplies and Transport (where it existed at all) came under the Commissariat, a department of the Treasury. The Medical Department was financed by politicians and controlled by the Treasury!! Clothing was handled by a whole Board of Generals who had to agree any initiatives - small wonder that uniforms had remained largely unchanged since Waterloo. No less than three government ministries were involved in different aspects of financing the Army, including total responsibility for the Army overseas (the East India Company paid for Regiments serving in India) and the Yeomanry and Militia, the equivalent of today's TA/National Guard, at home. As is the habit with Government Ministries, their first priority was to keep costs down. The very existence of the Army was subject to annual parliamentary vote. Yes, it sounds like a recipe for total shambles, but at least the C-in-C had control of his main fighting arms? In practice this was far from true. Infantry and Cavalry Regiments were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels. Up to and including this rank, officers bought their commissions, and in order to ensure that the nation's security rested snugly in the hands of the upper classes, they didn't come cheap. There was an official tariff, at todays prices (based on average earnings comparison)
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