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If supporters of drastic action had hoped that the Russian move into Moldavia would provoke a burst of activity from the other Powers, they were to be bitterly disappointed. The British government in particular assured the world at large that they were taking all possible steps to keep the situation constantly under review.
This apparent apathy was due to bitter divisions in the Cabinet. A turbulant political period had seen three different governments within two years. The current administration, headed by Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister, was a coalition of Whigs and Peel-ites (Conservative free trade faction). It contained nearly all the political heavyweights in Parliament, including three former Foreign Secretaries. First, Aberdeen himself, who was considered a conciliator by his friends, a waverer by his opponents. During his FO tenure, he had had a row with Stratford, then on an earlier assignment in Turkey. Stratford resigned as a result and spent several years in politics, breathing down Aberdeen's neck. (Stratford, for a renowned diplomat, seems to have upset an awful lot of people.) Anyway the link with Constantinople was not going to work to Stratford's advantage, if Aberdeen had anything to do with it. Next was Russell, the latest ex, now Minister without Office. He knew Tsar Nicholas well enough to have had secret talks with him. Last but not least was the current Home Secretary Palmerston, previously sacked from the FO for recognising Louis Napoleon's coup without authority; ever the man of action, and a loose cannon on a Churchillian scale. Clarendon, the current incumbent of the job, could have done without the stream of gratuitous advice emanating from the back seat. On one issue however, the British Cabinet was united. Contrary to the rising tide of press and public opinion, no one wanted war with Russia. Nor for that matter did Louis Napoleon, although he was no diplomat, and his team had no experience to advise him, nor to inspire confidence or achieve influence with their British allies. But he took the initiative of talking to the Austrians. Traditional allies of Russia, they were nonetheless very concerned at the prospect of the Russian incursion leading to fighting along the Balkan stretches of the Danube, their main trade route. As a result Napoleon succeeded in brokering a Vienna conference for France Austria and Britain, aimed at hammering out a compromise proposal. The outcome was the Vienna Note, finalised on 31st July. The one contentious issue in the Note was the provision that no modification of the current government of Christians within the Ottoman Empire would be permitted in future without the consent of Russia and France. Nicholas signified that he was happy with this; not so the Sultan. Turkey hadn't been invited to the conference, and he was being presented not only with a fait accompli but also a humiliating surrender of sovereignty. He proposed an amendment based on a previous note that Stratford had cooked up for him, but which had not been delivered due to the virtual local shutdown in the months of Ramadan and Bairam. Turkey would guarantee that the long held rights of the Ottoman Christians would remain unchanged in perpetuity. Aberdeen ordered Stratford to pressure the Sultan into accepting the Vienna Note, but in view of what had gone on before, this put Stratford in an impossible position; the Sultan persisted with his amendment which was turned down flat by Russia. To all intents the Vienna Note was dead, particularly as it became clear to Britain and France that Russia interpreted it as carte blanche to interfere at will on behalf of the Ottoman Christians. Go To Page: 1 2
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