Confidence was high at lower levels as well. Midshipman Wood was dissuaded by his fellows from buying a gold watch, booty from the Alma battle, for £1 from a soldier. He would have all the watches he wanted for nothing within 48 hours in Sevastopol was the confident prediction.
But as an initial priority, the bombardment needed to be effective. How would the Navy gunners integrate into the Siege Artillery domain? There were no formal timed fire plans, and batteries would fire independently at opportunity targets as presented, so there was no need for coordinated action. The bluejackets had the advantage of manpower; their gun crews numbered between 36 and 28, compared to the Royal Artillery detachments, limited to between 9 and 6. This was because the Navy operated their shipboard 'watch' system of 24 hour duties. A gun crew was divided into four watches, two on during the day, and one at night. Watches One and Two would come on duty at first light. Watch One would leave at last light. Watches Three and Four came on at first light on day two, with Watch Three leaving at last light. On day three Watches One and Two came on duty at first light; Watch Two left at last light. And so on. This meant that over a four day period, each Watch had thirty six hours duty. (Yes, I needed to see it written down as well!!) This compared with the Royal Artillery, with only two reliefs, equating to fifty six hours duty every four days. Taking into account travelling time between camp and gun positions, Jocelyn calculates this at forty hours work and fifty six hours rest per four days for the Navy, compared to Army gunners with sixty hours work and thirty six hours rest over the equivalent period. In a bombardment lasting several days, in theory the Navy would be able to operate at peak efficiency longer that the Army.
The theory however would not be tested during the First Bombardment. Shortly after dawn on 17th October, it was the Russians who surprised everyone by opening up a concerted barrage, albeit short lived. It was evident that their spies had tipped them off as to the allied intentions. Shortly afterwards all Greeks were expelled from Balaklava and Kamiesch, but the Russians would still be forewarned of most allied moves until the final Malakov assault.
