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The combat role of the Royal Navy local to the actual Siege of Sevastopol is often conceived to have been restricted to the less than successful bombardment of the city forts in mid-October 1854. In fact a far more significant role was played by the highly effective if less prominent Naval Brigade.
The rationale for a naval presence on land came from the decision in late September 1854 to use siege artillery to break down the as yet brittle defence works as part of a massive bombardment prior to taking the town by infantry assault. The Royal Artillery build up of these heavy guns was far from complete, and a ready source of supply of comparable long range weapons was available on the warships of the fleet. The Navy also had two guns with the new Lancaster rifling, the elliptical bore almost doubling the range of the traditional smoothbores out to 4500 yards, though test firing had shown performance and especially accuracy,to be erratic. However the new siege artillery rationale was to throw a heavier shell from longer ranges, and the Lancaster fitted in neatly with this concept. In sum, it was decided that some 50 guns from selected warships would be landed at Balaklava and conveyed to the plateau where they would be positioned and served by Royal Naval detachments. There was no shortage of volunteers for what was seen by the bluejackets as a welcome change from the routine of shipboard life. Every vacancy would be filled instantly during the Brigade's nine month existence, although it was perhaps just as well that noone could foretell that only three or four would make it through the whole period. At present, the order was for 140 men per ship-of-the-line with a proportion of officers - typically, as from HMS Queen, a Commander, two gunnery officers, a mate and a midshipman. From the start, the intention was that each ship's detachment would act as a unit and fight their own guns, although later on as substantial casualties were taken these distinctions became blurred. The initial landings were made smoothly enough on 1st October. The immediate preoccupation for all ranks was to keep down a generous dose of quinine against the cholera, but the problems of moving the heavy 68 pound and 10 inch guns up the ill defined,overused and badly eroded Col track were soon evident. The army politely enough made it clear that there was no transport available for them. (30-40 horses were required to move a 68 pounder gun, only slightly fewer, 24 horses, for a 32 pounder.) They were able to go as far as providing a few artillery travelling carriages, but they only had enough for the 68 pounders. All the other guns would have to go up on their shipboard mounting, known as 'trucks', with 18 inch diameter wooden wheels.
The copyright of the article The Naval Brigade Part 1 in Crimean War is owned by John Barham. Permission to republish The Naval Brigade Part 1 in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
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