The 1855-6 winter epidemic in the French Army, and the breakdown of their administrative system - in particular the medical services - which it provoked, took everyone by surprise. The result was every bit as catastrophic as that experienced by the British a year earlier, and numerically even more so.
How could this come about, bearing in mind that the French, arriving in the Crimea with recent experience of administering protracted campaigns in an inhospitable climate, had fashioned their services accordingly and had manifestly stood the test of the previous cruel winter, held up as a shining example by the severe critics of the woeful efforts of the British Commissariat?
Well to start with, there was no comparison in the size of the area they covered. At the onset of the bitter winter of 1854-5 the bulk of the French Army was deployed on the western side of the siege lines, close to their base harbours of Kamietch and Kazatch. The rest, manning fixed defences along the eastern edge of Sapourne Heights, also had easy access to the supply depots and facilities adjoining the ports. But a year later the Army was strung out over a huge area. Although the siege positions were no more, there were 40 kms of ground held in depth fronted along the Tchernaya and reaching eastward as far as the Baidar Valley. Many units were sited in semi-tactical positions - scrapes draped with sheets of canvas and lean-to shelters; scant protection against a second winter. Furthermore instead of enjoying the comfort of an established and effective supply chain, they were largely obliged to fend for themselves - every day the men had to roam ever farther afield to find wood, water, and food, carrying out fatigues of all kinds, as well as providing details for a long march back to guard duty and manual labour at Kamiesch. This wearisome and continuous activity wore down the men's natural resistance, and made them susceptible to sickness.
Then there were shortcomings in the way the mens' accommodation was positioned. According to Doctor Jean-Baptiste Baudens who conducted an enquiry into the causes of the catastrophe, habitations were sited too close together, often almost touching. This was especially true for the majority in tents or huts, The doctor maintained that the huts and especially the tents should have been sited sufficiently far apart to allow their frequent change of position to clean ground uncontaminated by the detritus of everyday human and animal living. As an example, he cites the lines of the 81st Ligne, a regiment which came through the winter relatively unscathed. Their tents were well spaced out. They had taken the trouble to pave their walkways with stones and ensured their permanence by planting pine saplings along their borders. Their tent flaps were raised during the day as well as the articular circular flooring which folded upwards from the ridgepole to the sides. The whole area was spotlessly clean.
