Sardinia and the War - Part 2

After his second visit to the French Emperor, and notwithstanding statements from War Minister Vaillant and British Ambassador Cowley that Piedmont would work together with the British, La Marmora was convinced that the French reserve army on the Bosphorus would be the initial location of the Sardinian Army. Even though, in London, during his visit on Feb 26th, Prime Minister Clarendon and Secretary at War Panmure didn’t permit any doubt as to their opinion about the location of the Sardinian Army -in the Crimea and under Raglan’s orders - La Marmora was still convinced that the Emperor’s plans would hold good. Both the Emperor and his Ambassador to Sardinia Guiche did their best to encourage La Marmora’s conviction. The Emperor sent his detailed plans for the concentration on the Bosphorus through his aide-de-camp Col. Béville, before the departure of the latter to Constantinople.

It was quite natural that La Marmora would prefer collaboration with the French. Between the Italians and the English a language barrier existed. On the Italian side, with the exception of Capt. Thaon di Revel, who was appointed Sardinian Liaison Officer to the English headquarters, hardly any Italian officers spoke English, though most of them were familiar with the French language. More important still was that La Marmora greatly preferred to be connected to the French Reserve Army commanded by the Emperor himself, than to be subordinated to an English general who was heavily criticised in England as well as in France. Furthermore the army that Raglan commanded was hardly bigger than his. La Marmora’s preferences also infected Cavour and their behaviour gave birth to a diplomatic crisis that almost wrecked Sardinian participation in the coalition. This crisis lasted only a few days and was kept out of the public domain and concealed from the Military, but it had a delaying effect on the departure of the Sardinian expedition.

Cavour, convinced that his army would be incorporated into the reserve army of the French, wrote on April 3rd along these lines to his representative in London, Emanuele d’Azeglio. The same day the latter received a letter from Lord Clarendon stating that the military jurisdictional position of their respective armies was ‘quite simple’ and that Cavour should acquiesce. Without firmly expressing his ideas it was clear what Clarendon meant: the Sardinians were to come under

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