When Florida versus Joe Nixon commenced, the state and the defense entered into plea negotiations, which quickly fell apart, because defense counsel, Michael Corin, wanted to save his client's life. The state? Well they would settle for nothing less than Nixon's head under a guillotine. Seeing that the state had an ironclad confession in its pocket, and the confessees testimony to back it up, Mr. Corin made a decision; he would concede his client's guilt, and try to save his life during the punishment phase. So, he took it to Nixon, who didn't even seem interested, wouldn't say a word when Mr. Corin attempted to explain his plan. More than once. Still, silence.
A man who just couldn't wait to brag about his vile act, wouldn't open his mouth when asked to participate in his defense. Mr. Corin pressed forward, under the assumption that no response at all was a green light to pursue his strategy. Nixon was ultimately convicted and sentenced to die - probably by electric chair at the time. The question left in the trial's aftermath: does a defense attorney's concession that his client committed murder, made without the defendant's express consent, automatically rank as prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel, necessitating a new trial?
That question was first presented to the Florida Supreme Court, applying a different standard than is typically applied in ineffective assistance cases. That body answered yes, because this was essentially a guilty plea on Mr. Corin's part.
The Supreme Court, however, wasn't buying. Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous court - except for Chief Justice Renquist - related the correct standard for ineffective counsel, which is laid out in Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 688. The question a reviewing court must answer is, "did the attorney's representation fall below the objective standard of reasonableness?"
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