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Is it moral for the government to take an individual's life when that individual hasn't taken one?
Ponder this. A man sexually assaults an eight year old child. The child is hurt so badly that she requires surgery, and is, in all likelihood emotionally scarred for the rest of her life. More poignant is her testimony during the defendant's trial which reveals abuse over a substantial period of time. I can see jurors wincing from the pain they absorb from the victim's words; then, wanting desperately to lash out and seek retributive justice on her behalf, they employ a potent weapon at their disposal: the death penalty. Is justice being well-served? Justification for the death penalty being instituted solicits a different answer for virtually every time the question is raised. But surely, at its core, the ultimate punishment should be reserved for those who have killed others - if it is to be used at all (that's another sizzling debate). Several states have laws that allow a jury to consider capital punishment for nondeath offenses. And the federal government sanctions the death penalty for nondeath crimes, such as espionage and treason. For insight into the mind-set of those charged with monitoring punishments, you might examine Furman vs. Georgia, the 1972 decision that temporarily halted executions. Prior to 1972, it was seemingly an accepted reality that capital punishment was woven into the fabric of our society, regardless of how haphazardly, and wrongly, it was applied. Each of the five Justices who comprised the majaority in Furman provided a different perspective for deciding the way they did. Two Justices reflected that the death penalty is both cruel and unusual (an Eighth Amendment prohibition) because it was applied in an arbitrary, wanton and freakish manner; and it was applied so infrequently that it served no justifying end. This intriguing explanation seems to trump any asserted rationale for imposing capital punishment, based on the belief that the severest of sentences is unevenly applied. Another Justice asserted that the death penalty is inflicted on poor, unlucky defendants, while the wealthy and socially advanced tend to escape such a fate. In other words, there was a hint of an Equal Protection violation, because those who are (criminally) same or similarly situated don't receive the same punishment. While these three Justices found fault with the way the death penalty was rendered, they left room for reinstatement with "safeguards" for inherent problems. But the final two Justices weren't in such a generous mood. The death penalty, they proclaimed, was per se cruel and unusual because it didn't comport with human dignity. Presumably, they felt that there wasn't a safeguard to be found that could justify mere mortals passing such grave judgment on other mere mortals. |
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