By March, the future Army of the Tennessee had advanced to a picturesque spot along the west bank of the Tennessee River called Pittsburg Landing. A few miles inland from the landing was a small wooden building known locally as Shiloh Meeting House. The peaceful woods and fields surrounding the drab-looking structure seemed far removed from the horrors of war.
Less than 25 miles south of the Union encampment was the town of Corinth, Mississippi, site of an important railroad junction and, not coincidentally, current headquarters for the Confederate Army of the Mississippi. Following their retreat from Kentucky the Confederates had eventually regrouped at Corinth, hoping to protect the all-important railroad and reverse the fortunes of war. To reverse those fortunes they needed a victory. And the Union army camped at Pittsburg Landing offered a tempting target.
At the moment, that Union army was waiting for the arrival of yet another Union army - the Army of the Ohio - currently marching over from Nashville to affect a junction around Pittsburg Landing. From there the combined force would advance against the outnumbered southern defenders at Corinth.
Instead of passively waiting for this inevitable Union attack, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston decided to go on the attack himself. He would move first, taking his army to Pittsburg Landing and striking the Union army camped there. With luck, they would destroy that army or force its surrender before the Army of the Ohio arrived to help.
The Confederates moved out from Corinth on April 3rd, with Johnston planning to attack the next day. A rash of unexpected problems forced the southern commander to postpone his plans first once and then twice. By the evening of the 5th, all was finally ready. The attack was set for the next morning - Sunday, April 6th, 1862.
Warning Signs
Incredibly, these tens of thousands of Confederates had managed to approach almost literally within shooting distance of the Union army virtually undetected. This was due more to carelessness and overconfidence within the northern lines as opposed to southern stealth. Despite the best efforts of their officers, the Rebels had not exactly tiptoed silently up to their unsuspecting foe. Yet even as dawn approached on the morning of April 6th, the vast majority of the Yankee army suspected nothing.
| Here's the follow-up discussion on this article: | View all related messages |
For a complete listing of article comments, questions, and other discussions related to Perry Cuskey's U.S. Civil War topic, please visit the Discussions page.